Good morning all. This trial is in the matter of CFI0912024 and CFI068 2024 and is being held by way of video conferencing before his excellency justice Michael Black with the sitting of the hearing taking place in Dubai. Any orders or directions made during the course of or after this hearing will be issued by the registry in Dubai on the judge's instructions. The claimant is represented by Trowers and Hamlins. Lead council is Mr. Matthew Watson. The defendant is represented by Vincent Mason's lead council is Mr. Lawrence Page. Thank you. >> You're Mr. Watson. >> Thank you your honor. Um what I propose to do in closing is to follow broadly the structure that I uh followed in my opening which is to deal with the uh loan claim first and then the JV claim and within the loan claim to deal first with the obligation to lend and then the issues that arise depending on how your honor decides that issue uh and then uh to deal with the JV claim and to deal firstly with the termination issue and then the question of any relief if the you find that the contract wasn't validly terminated and and finally to deal with the the counter claim. So uh diving right in with the loan claim and the obligation to let the issue is of course whether KGM can show that uh clause 2B was either breached in the sense that there was an obligation to lend and um uh that was not performed or that clause 2B was waved. Um there's a question about whether um a banana duty is owed at all and I don't resolve from that position but in my submission your honor doesn't need to decide that question because even if there was a duty KJM has not shown that it was breached and so I'm going to address that question first and then say a few things about whether the duty arises and then address um the waiver issue probably The appropriate place to start is is what is the standard required of a decision maker under a banana duty? And um the honor should certainly stop me if at any point I'm I'm teaching you to suck eggs, but I thought we we'd start with Banza itself, which your honor will find in the supplementary bundle at page 573 is the the relevant starting point. If we could zoom into paragraph 18. This is the the judgment of Lady Hail. She starts at the top of paragraph 18 saying contractual terms in which one party to the contract is given the power to exercise a discretion or to form an opinion as to relevant facts are extremely common. and ends that paragraph by saying, "The courts have sought to ensure that such contractual powers are not abused, done so by implying a term as to the manner in which such powers may be exercised, a term which may vary according to the terms of the contract and the context in which the decision maker is given." Paragraph 19, a very important paragraph, your honor. There's an obvious parallel, she says, between cases where a contract assigns decision-making function and cases where a statute assigns a decision-making function to a public authority. In neither case is the court the primary decision maker. The primary decision maker is the contracting party. It is right therefore that the standard of review generally adapted by the courts uh to the decisions of a contracting party should be no more demanding than the standard of review adopted in judicial review. So your honor is not asking is this a reasonable decision or is this the decision that I would have made if I was contestant. your honor is is concerned in a sort of quasi public law sense with the quality of the decision making. And I'm just going to flesh a little bit of that out for your honor. Um there's a quote in the middle of paragraph 20. This is just going to show you a little bit about how the thinking of this has evolved. Um this is a a quote from Lord Justice Leget as he then was in Abu Dhabi National. Um actually I think that's Leot Senior. Um in my judgment the authorities show uh not that not only must the discretion be exercised honestly and in good faith but having regard to the provisions of the contract by which it is conferred it must not be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably. And then if if one goes over the page you can see a little B essentially what there was in the authorities was a discussion about what what does unreasonable mean in this context and it didn't mean um and you get it uh then the answer from Lord Justice Ricken Sausa and that quotation that's at D and F I won't read it to you but you want to can read it in his own time. What what reasonleness in this concept didn't mean was an objective standard of reasonleness like a duty to take care or where the court is fixing a reasonable price. What matters is reasonleness in a Wsbury sense and your honor can see it little C. Um unreasonleness is now abandoned as a term and what is uh generally used is irrationality. You can see that it substitutes the more modern term irrationality for unreasonleness. That's at C. And then at um uh paragraph 23, Lady Hail sites the judgment of your assumption in Hayes and Willoughby about what rationality actually means. It says rationality is not the same as reasonleness. Reasonableness is an external objective standard applied to the outcome of a person's thoughts or intentions. A test of rationality by comparison applies a minimum objective standard to the relevant person's mental processes. It imports a requirement of good faith, a requirement that there should be some logical connection between the evidence and the ostensible reasons um for the decision. That's what it means to make a rational decision. So to give your honor an example in the context of this case, if Contessa had said this admiral report is unsatisfactory because it's in a Times New Roman font and I don't like Times New Roman, that would be a classic irrational decision because the reason has no logical connection with the purpose for which the decisions got to be made. Similarly, if contestants said, "Well, this report's unsatisfactory because I don't like people called Enzo." That that would be a classic irrational decision. So, what you're what your one is looking for is in the decision- making, is there some logical connection between the the reasons for the decision and um the the the the discretion that's been given to the party. And if if we go over the the page to 576 and focus in on um paragraph 30, the the the question um that was being actually posed here in Banza um and uh is addressed at paragraph 30 is whether where you're dealing with a term it's the full um public test of Wesbury unreasonleness which is the decision's got to be rational I. You've got to um take into account relevant things and not take into account irrelevant things. And also um a decision has got to be one that no reasonable decision maker could make. That's the other limb if you're going to to challenge these sorts of tests. And at the end of Pagle 30, you can see that Lady Hail says that she would include both limbs of the Wensby formulation in the rationality test. So a decision is irrational if irrelevant considerations are taken into account or if the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker could have come to it. One last paragraph from the authorities um which is just over the page on 577 at 32. This is just an important bit of context for your honor. Um she says it's unnecessary to reach a final conclusion on the precise extent to which an implied contractual term may differ from the principles applicable to judicial review given that the question may arise in many different contractual contexts. It may be that no precise answer can be given. The particular context of this case is an employment contract which as Lord Hodgej explains is of a different character from an ordinary commercial contract. Any decision-making function entrusted to the employer has to be exercised in accordance with the implied obligation of trust and confidence. And this must be borne in mind in considering how the contractual decision maker should approach the question. And then she goes on to actually address the facts of that case. In that case, an employer had to decide whether an employee had committed suicide because if the employee had committed suicide, then the company was obliged to pay some money and the employer had to make that decision. So it's quite a different case but the point for your honor is that um the standard of review um is to some extent uh dependent upon the contractual context and here you've not got say an employment relationship you've got two um sophisticated commercial parties and in my suggest in my submission it's a it's a high bar to say that a commercial decision taken by one is one that no reasonable in this case lender um could take. But I'll just pause here to deal with a short point. Um, it's because this is the test that KJM took a new point in its skeleton to say that satisfactory refers only to the quality of the report and not the quality of the yacht. And the reason for doing that, the tactical reason for doing that is to try to make all the issues uh about the quality of the yacht an irrelevant consideration. Um, your honor indicated um that he didn't think there was much force in this point. There isn't any, and I'll address it very briefly. Satisfactory in clause 2B obviously pertains to the condition of the yacht. Contessa was only interested in a survey to discover the condition of the yacht. That's the whole purpose of it. um on KJM's construction that satisfactory only refers to the quality of the report. Contessa could have received a report that's a thousand pages long with every rivet carefully inspected, but the conclusion is the boat has a huge hole in its hole and still been obliged to lend. That's the that's the logical consequence of that construction is that you can get an absolutely perfect report, but the boat is in a terrible condition, not seaorthy, potentially even beyond economic repair. Contessa is obliged to lend. That can't be right. And there's also an important part of the the background factual matrix and I'll just take you to two emails which I don't think you has yet seen. in the core bundle. Uh starts at page 1890. This is just before the um loan agreement was signed. I see there's an email from Casey Flipman to Muhammad Al Jasmi and they're talking about the u the terms and the original proposal as you can see from the bottom is the balance be paid within five business days upon receipt of the written notice of acceptance of the vessel. So the original proposal was KJM will accept the vessel from the shipyard and then Quantessa will pay and at 589 sorry 1189 sorry that I'm I'm going too quickly 1889. Um and if we could just scroll down we see the response to that email from Mr. Jasmine on the 30th of May and he proposes something different balance to be paid within 5 days of receipt of satisfactory report for appointed surveyor. This is in lie of the factory will only allow us to accept the vessel only once complete payment is done. So it was known to both parties prior to contracting that the factory would only release the vessel finally once it had received that final payment. And in my submission that that part of the background factual matrix is very important when it comes to construing clause 2B. as everyone understood that that final payment was to be made once the factory once the vessel was in a condition where it could be accepted. So if there were any issues with the boat, they need to be sorted out before you get payment. And so that explains your honor what clause 2B is actually about. And it's about two things. Firstly, there has to be a survey. So, Contessa is not obliged to rely on the shipyard's assertion or KJM's assertion. It relies on the assessment of an independent professional. And the survey has to be satisfactory. In other words, the boat has to be in a condition where it could be accepted from the shipyard. Essentially, it's finished. So, that's the contractual standard, the meaning of satisfactory. I'm going to move to address what is in my submission the central factual issue for your honor which is when the admiral >> sorry you said you said two things said so the first is there must be a survey >> and the second is that the the survey has to be satisfactory >> okay so that's the second >> namely the boat the boat has to be in a condition where it could be accepted Okay. >> So, moving on to the the question of delivery of the admiral report. As I say, this is the central factual issue for your honor. And in my submission, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that it was sent for the first time by you now on the 11th of July, 2024. And that's the email. We don't need to go to it at page 1287. The burden is on KJM because it asserts that the condition was fulfilled and it asserts that the report was sent earlier than that and it has not discharged that burden. And in my submission, there are five reasons why your honor can be confident that it was not sent until the 11th of July. The first is the failure of Mr. Al Jasmi to give any real evidence on this issue until yesterday. The first time anyone had suggested that he personally had handed over the document was in his oral testimony. It was in response to your honor's question and you'll see it at day three, page 17, lines 12 to 17. We we don't need to go there. Thank you. I'll just read the transcript. Read the um read the the reference into the transcript. Now, Mr. Al Jazzmi even said that perhapa never said he was there. That account that your honor was given that there was a meeting perouch was there. Al Jasmine handed it over. It was at the KJM offices. It was not in the defense. The relevant paragraph is paragraph 12 at the defense which was in at page 20. That account was not in the RFI response which is at page 38 of the bundle. And importantly, it was not in Mr. Al Jasmine's witness statement. That's page 95 of the bundle, paragraph 40. His evidence was just that KJM shared the report at some unknown time and in some unknown way. If what Mr. Al Jasmine was saying was true, it is frankly incredible that he was unable to give an account any earlier than his or all testimony yesterday. he would surely have remembered and he even uh accepted in his evidence that he had put everything important that he remembered into his witness statement. That was at day three, page 23, lines 3 to 7. But on this issue, his witness statement was bare and he had no real explanation for his failure to give an account. I pressed him on it. That's at day three, page 25, starting at lines eight. But he didn't have an answer. And even if for some reason he didn't have it in his first witness statement, he should have been prompted after seeing Mr. Ivankovic's witness statement because Mr. Jasmine had a had a second chance to to write a responsive witness statement. And he says he read Mr. of Vankovich's witness statement and he he responds on a whole series of peripheral issues but not on this central question. They had no explanation for why he wasn't prompted after reading Mr. Ivankovic's statement. That's at day three page 33 to 36. His only real explanation for why none of this was covered is that this is the first time I appear in court. Now your honor, that sort of explanation might just wash if Mr. Al Jasmine had been instructing local lawyers who are unfamiliar with DIFC or common law procedure. But um Pinson Masons are one of the jurisdions preeminent litigation firms if I may say so. One obviously cannot know what went on behind the veil of privilege between the lawyer and the client. But surely penc must have been desperate for Mr. Al Jasmine to explain himself. Um because this is the central factual issue. But but they got nothing until yesterday. And it it seemed I think that Mr. Jasmine's account was news even to my learner friend because this account that there was a meeting at which um perouch was there and it was in the offices and it was in July and the uh report was handed over um was not in the skeleton argument. The explanation for instance that the reason why there's no email is because Mr. Vanovich said, "Oh, don't send any emails to my lawyers." That was the story that was given at day three, page 17, line six. That wasn't put to Mr. Ivankovich. Indeed, Mona Friend wasn't even able to put any of the specifics. The way it was put to Mr. Ivankovich was that it was that the report was handed to you in July 2023 or at the very latest by September. That was day two page 81 line one. Now if um if Mr. Al Jasmine had been giving a consistent account from the beginning Mala friend would have very properly been able to put that account to Mr. Ivankovich but he didn't. And the reason he didn't was because he couldn't and the reason because the reason he couldn't was because we only got that story for the first time yesterday. So that's the first reason Mr. Al Jasmy's inability to explain how the report came to Mr. Ivankovich until yesterday. The second reason is the inability of KGN to tell a consistent story. If your honor will recall, the defense said that the report was quote sent not delivered it sent. Then the RFI said that it was response said it was handd delivered in July 2023 and provided in February 2024 and then Mr. Al Jasmi in the witness box said that that was wrong because he said it was the corrective actions report that was provided in February 2024. That's day three, page 20, line six. So in the course of his evidence, Mr. Jasmine was saying the RFI response was wrong. If your honor will recall, the expert had been told by someone that it had been handed on the 27th of September 2023. You know, that's a very specific fact to have been told, not it was sent between July and September or it was sent in September. The expert had been told it was handed on the 27th of September. But no one seemed to think that was correct. And Mr. Al Jasmy's witness statement didn't say it was hand delivered and he didn't say he died first. He just said it'd been provided. So KGM has been unable to tell a consistent story. The third reason why your honor can be confident is that by contrast Contessa's position has been consistent throughout from the very beginning of this litigation in the pleadings in the witness statements uh and in Mr. Ankovich's old testimony that the first time this report was seen was in July 2024 and the relevant part of the old testimony is day two at page 80 and that's consistent of course with the contemporary documentation. You want to might remember, we just quickly turn it up. Page 132. This is the email. If we just scroll up a little bit to orient ourselves with the date uh on the 23rd of July 2024 from Casey Flipman where she explains Contessa's position on the three documents that had been received on the 11th of July 2024. She says these three documents are not satisfactory. She deals with the letter from Sina Eagle and says well it doesn't really tell us anything. um deals with the corrective actions report and she says there are just pictures what's going on and then in relation to the admiral report note from Casey the survey is more than a so if we just scroll down on the screen please uh thank you note from Casey the survey is more than a year old and there were repairs and improvements made in February 2024 is there an updated survey So she the first thing the contest says about this survey when it's received in July 2024 is well this is a year out of date. Have you got have you got a more recent what what must have occurred behind the scenes for KJM's case to be true? What um Moren Co having received this survey in July 2024 show it to Mr. Ivankovich and Mr. Vanovich lies to them and he says, "I've never seen this before." And so Casey uh sends that email saying, "This is a year old." Far more likely is that um Mr. Vankovich, well, I've not seen this before. And the response that then goes back to KJM is well, this is a year out of date. The fourth reason is the inherent improbability of this report being handd delivered as the only method of its transmission. All the other important documents in this case passed between the parties electronically. Ju just two examples. I'll read the references into the transcript. The loan agreement sent by email. That's page 1893. And Admiral Marine's original quote sent by email 1 1909. But your honor only needs to just flick through the bundle. and every other document is an email attaching a purchase order or a letter or something that because that's how business is done in the modern age. So your honor has to ask yourself what is the inherent probability that the crucial document that triggers uh arguably the obligation to pay is provided only by hand in a meeting. Your honor heard Mr. Ankovich's evidence that he would have asked if if it had been given to him um uh by hand. He would have asked that it be sent to his his lawyers by email. He gave that account in his witness statement as well. Um that's why when he was coming up with his story, Mr. Jasmine had to invent this conspiracy between him and and Mr. Ivankovich of not sending it to the lawyers. And the fifth and final reason why honor can be confident this document was not sent until July 2024 is the absence of any documentary trace of the Admiral report having been received before then. Even if it had only been provided by hand in July 2023, there would surely be some trace of it in the documents. At the very least, it would be discussed. And I'll just give you a something to contrast it with. If your honor, we don't need to go there now, but goes back and has has a look at pages 1075 and 1102. Those are the exchanges in relation to the sunseker between the surveyor and um uh Parouch and Moren Co and Olly Hand discussing all the snagging in relation to the Sunseeker. Now those are just two emails. The idea that if the admiral report had been sent had been provided by hand there that there wouldn't be any emails of that kind no record of any discussion about the snags what was going to be done even if you want takes the view that they're just minor snags there would surely be some record of some discussion but there isn't >> can we just wind back slightly have you finished your your your five reasons >> yes your >> can we just wind that slightly because as I understood the the thrust of Mr. Ivankovich's evidence um he was not persuaded that there was an actual contract of sale for this vessel at all. Well, I think I think that is um to be fair to Mr. Vankovich a view that he was coming to. It's I don't think he was ever specifically asked when he came to that view but um you you might remember that I took Mr. our Jasmi to the exchange in April where um uh the lawyers start asking for copies of the purchase agreement and um the response that comes back from Mr. how Jasmine is. Well, all this is confidential. You've got to come to my offices. I'm not not going to let you see it. And even now, we don't have a copy of the purchase agreement. We asked for it in disclosure. I might just show you, your honor, the response that was received because that's um it is we just deal with this point quickly now. Um the um the best way to get into this is at page 438 of the bundle. This was an email from my solicitors to Pinser Masons and um uh they say request number one of the claimants request to produce sort a copy of the contract between Sino Eagle and the defendant purchase of the Aquilla and there was no objection to production and they and we said we note the document was missing from the documents disclosed. Document number one which is provided by the defendant contain an email from Wasim Kadra to Ivan Mu. That email refers to a signed addendum. Please provide to the company with a signed addendum along with the contract between Sino Eagle and the defendant for the um production of for the purchase of the yacht. Now your honor might remember I opened Mr. Al Jasmy's cross-examination with that email. It's at page 925 of the Bundling to go there. So this was the and your honor saw there was a very brief exchange payment of a million deposit. No terms, nothing about price, nothing about payment schedules, nothing about delivery. It was very sketchy. >> So page 9 925. >> 925. >> Uh where am I looking? Thank you for sending signed document proof of payment transfer. >> Yes. and and and if you your honor scrolls down to 96, you get the original email from uh KJN. >> Uh so we we are plea well yes we are pleased to enclose the signed addendum. >> So what is the signed addendum? >> Well um Mr. Jasmine's evidence was that it was nothing to do with this at all. It was all to do with something >> Oh yes, he said about Egypt. Egypt. And can I just show your honor just to complete the inter parties correspondence? >> So those two emails >> those two emails that you've just looked at are the sum total of the disclosure on the question can we see the contract? >> So that is it. >> Now Mr. Haidel yesterday said that there was a master agreement. >> He did >> signed addendum sounds consistent with the master agreement. >> It does. It's not it's not been produced. I'll show you the the response from my learner friend solicitors. That's at page 435. Hold on one second. page >> uh 435 >> 435 >> and here it is. So Mr. Nana says um in response to the query below one we did consider the addendum and determined that it was not responsive on grounds of relevance as the document relates to a different matter. So it seems that the lawyers at Pin Mason they looked at the side addendum and they thought that it related to something different. You know, I've got no reason to to um doubt that and it's consistent with what >> one explanation of course could be that the million dollars that your client gave was used in a different transaction. >> It it it it could well be and the the constant theme that runs through the entirety of both cases is the porcity of information that is actually provided to the Ivankovich side. And then the the second >> I well that I see I I mean the question is of course what inferences I can properly draw from the absence of any documentation. Well, in my submission, you don't necessarily need to decide the question about whether there was a sale contract because the only the only pleaded issue that this is relevant to is the counter claim by KJM because um KJM says that as a result of Contessa not paying um KJM lost the money that it had paid to Sino Eagle. And what my learner friend can't do is point to any contractual term about a payment schedule. And he can't point to any contractual term that entitled the shipyard to forfeit. Yes, the the shipyard wrote letters saying we are forfeiting, but just because a party asserts a right to do something doesn't mean that it has in fact got that right. And I say um your honor, there is something remarkably odd about the fact that KJM cannot produce any document whether it's an email, memorandum, whatever that that shows the agreement about the price, an agreement about the particular vessel to be purchased. >> Yeah. I mean Yes. I mean from your point of view as as council this is all sort of a very elegant submission but sitting here as the judge I have to make findings of fact uh and one of the findings of fact is that I'm that I must decide whether or not there was in fact a contract of sale for this vessel. >> Well, your honor has got those two uh emails. Your honor has got the fact that there is no other disclosure and your honor has got what Mr. Al Jasmi and Mr. Arabad want to say in evidence. >> Yeah. >> And that that that is it. And your honor may may come to the view that that is not sufficient to prove the existence of a contract because if there were a contract there would be some email where they say yes it's this boat with this whole registration number and these options and this is the payment schedule and I mean because even even your honor just standing back the 9th of August cut off date that Sinole imposed where they say beyond this we're just going to forfeit. Where's the contractual basis for that? Where's the Where's the Where's the term that says you must pay by this date or so many days after a notice or whatever? Nothing. And the other issue of fact is it said that there was an initial deposit of a million and then the other 1.6 was paid uh but we we never see a payment of 1.6 million.6 million at any point. We see a number of other payments >> which total more than 6. >> Yeah. But we don't know whether they were paid in respect of this transaction if it existed or other transactions. >> No. And they are a dealer for Aquilla. So the fact that they send money to Aquilla with a on a bank statement that says transaction reference Sino Eagle Aquilla doesn't tell you anything about whether this payment is for um any particular. >> No. not one of the payments I one would have expected if there was another uh I if if the second tranch deposit was um 600,000 one would have expected a single 600,000 payment. >> Yes. What's very odd is that certainly um the way it's presented right at the beginning is to suggest well there's an upfront the way it's presented to the Ivankovich family is to say well there's an upfront deposit of 1.6 6 million and then a balancing payment of 2.99. But that that doesn't seem to be what the real position is. But >> I don't know what the real position is. >> Well, I mean, if you go to the loan agreement as of the date of execution agreement, Contessa has paid 1 million.6 >> Yeah. >> deposit. >> Deposit. So the whole basis of of the loan agreement is the is the 1.6 was deposit. >> Y >> but on uh on KJ's case that actually it was only a million >> and that is what that is what it appears like we only found that out in disclosure. >> Yes. Yes. Okay. >> So as against um so just to return your to this question of um when the admiral report was delivered the only answer to it has been an attempt to construct an alternative narrative that in fact it was delivered um but Mr. Anankovich hadn't got the money and so was sort of putting trying to put everything off. And my submission just to that very briefly is that there really isn't much evidence for it. Mr. Ivankovich was very clear that that wasn't the case. That's day two, page 95 starting at lines three. Day two, page 117 line starting at lines 14. Um, a lot of weight is put on the fact that um, companies went into chapter 11, but your honor might recall that all the payments on behalf of Contessa come from a company called Gleno, which never went into chapter 11. And indeed, neither did Contessa. The truth is, the defendants don't have any real evidence on the Ivankovich family wealth. and your honor can understand something of it from Mr. Ivankovich's evidence that the family paid cash for the Sunseeker. That's >> Yes, the Sunseeker seems to get ignored in K Jones. >> It does. And I mean, the Vancouver family is a family who paid 11.5 million in cash for the boat. That's dangerous. >> When was that? When was that paid? I don't think we have that in evidence, your honor. But Mr. Vanovich is all in evidence on that is in day two and starts at pageund 117. So in my submission, your honor can find as a fact that the admiral report was received by Contessa for the first time on the 11th of July 2024 when it was sent by Mr. to Adwan by email. And at that point, it is a year out of date and the experts agree that a report that is a year out of date is not reliable evidence of the condition. So when Contessa is sitting there in July 2024 and receives a report that's dated July 2023, he's got no real idea what the condition of the vessel is. And it's obviously rational for a party in contest's position to say that's not satisfactory. The reference you're on, it's in my skeleton, but just you've got it for the experts agreement is page 327. And nothing about the corrected actions report changes that analysis. The contract didn't oblige contest to rely on anything that the shipyard said. And both experts accepted that it was not reliable evidence. That's also in the joint memo at page 327. And Mr. Folks accepted it in terms at the end of his cross-examination. That's day one, page 153. So to put it together for your honor like this, if your honor concludes that satisfactory in clause 2B includes the condition of the yacht and your honor finds as a fact that the survey report was received for the first time on the 11th of July 2024, your honor can conclude that whether or not there was a banana duty If there was such a duty, it was entirely rational for contestant to say as it did that that report was not satisfactory and therefore >> assuming I'm I'm satisfied that there was a contract for the purchase of of this vessel. >> Well, yeah. Yes, but to some extent I don't I don't need if your honor is not is not satisfied of that then that doesn't I don't think affect my case. If your honor is satisfied of that, I still succeed. So for all of those reasons, your honor, you don't actually need to get into the question of whether the defects that are identified in the report render the condition of the yacht unsatisfactory. But if your honor thinks that you do, I've just got three short points on them. >> Mhm. The first is that these defects, snags, whatever you want to call them, are plainly more than merely cosmetic. Your honor has already noted the issue with the air conditioning. Mr. Hung sets out several more. Uh, Milan friend sought to suggest that the air conditioning was just an error message based on a photo at page 10002. But the narrative that you has seen um makes it quite clear that the um the air conditioning problem was worse than that. And there are other problems that are >> well at best I we just don't know do we because at best >> at best it could be a matter of adjustment at worst it could be under specification >> exactly um and Mr. does descend to that sort of detail. And there are other examples that are obviously more than cosmetic. So page 981, this is my personal favorite. Uh if we scroll down a little bit, there's just a a panel that's missing. So that's not that's not cosmetic. That's just a part of the boat that either hasn't been manufactured or um if it's been manufactured, hasn't been installed. So all the parts are just exposed. There's another one of those that we don't need to go to it at page 995. So the first point is it's plainly more than cosmetic. Uh the second and this is the critical point your honor is that now in closing we know everyone thought that the yard needed to rectify these defects. That was Mr. Holmes's view and I'll just help you honor with that. At page 941, he gives his descriptions about consistency of reporting. And as my learner friend quite fairly pointed out, both good and satisfactory include no maintenance or repairs required. Satisfactory minor deficiencies not in need of correction. So good or satisfactory means no work needs to be done. But once you get as your honor spotted to 954 and we scroll down he points out that quite a lot needs to be done require further alignment at six should be added around the edges at seven. If we go over the page 14 and 15, he actually uses the word to be rectified requires attention right at the end shower hose to be replaced with new. So it's obvious that Mr. Hung thinks that work needs to be done. So what's the explanation? If we go back to 954, it's quite obvious what Mr. Hung is saying. Mr. If we just scroll up ever so slightly to the Thank you. Because Mr. Home's conclusion is that the vessel is generally satisfactory to good subject to comments as contained therein. Now he can't be saying the vessel is currently satisfactory to good because satisfactory to good means no work is required and he thinks work is required. So satisfactory to good subject to comments as contained herein can only mean this vassel would be satisfactory to good if one to uh 24 are addressed. So Mr. Hung thinks these need to be fixed. Mr. Folks was very clear in his evidence. KJM's expert day one page 152 line seven they do need to be remeded you know you're buying a brand new vessel you expect everything to be in A1 condition so yeah they needed to be rectified that's their expert Mr. Al Jasmine when he was giving his account of handing over this survey report to Mr. Ivankovic even he says uh quote I told him that is Steven that the factory would make the necessary corrections that's day three page 42 line and he said I wouldn't allow any boat to be shipped or to be delivered without checking it and making any necessary comments day three page 45. and he said that if something was wrong or incomplete, his employees uh would ask the shipyard to correct it. That's day three, page 44. Now, KJM obviously did think something was wrong or incomplete because it actually asked the shipyard to carry out some works and that's why the corrective actions document gets produced. So, KJM thought these needed to be uh rectified and obviously Mr. Vanovich did as well. He said when he saw the report in July, it wasn't in a salailable condition. That's paragraph 30 of his witness statement, page 81. So, no one thought this yacht was in a an immediately sailable condition. And the third point on the defects is simply this. Even if your honor thinks, well, I think this would have been fine. I'd be happy to go on a boat like this. Um, the question is is whether it's rational for contessor to say actually this condition isn't good enough and in my submission that that's a rational decision for it to make there's a logical connection between the reasons i.e. there are some problems with the yacht and the decision and there's this point that emerged and I'll just deal with it very briefly that KJM could have corrected the defect and so actually what could have happened is that um KGM could have just accepted this yacht in the condition that it was in July 2023 and carried out the repairs itself. Three points about that. The first is forensic. The first time that was suggested was in the learn of friend skeleton. It was not suggested at the time. No evidence that anyone at the time suggested KJM could do it. Not suggested in the pleadings and it's not suggested by any of the witnesses in any of their witness statements. So that's the first point. The second point, perhaps the most important is evidential. There is no evidence before the court that KJM could have conducted the works necessary to rectify the defects. I mean cleaning and polishing and uh scrubbing the toilets. Obviously >> I thought the evidence was the other way. I thought the evidence was they couldn't that that that they couldn't do it. >> Well, your honor is quite right and this is the crucial bit. Um Mr. Al Jazzmi and Mr. the hydra wall in their witness statements they don't say that KJN had the facilities to c to repair the defects listed in the report that the the submission was pure speculation by my learner friend >> but I recollect I recollect and I'll have to search the the transcript but I recollect that one witness and I don't I can't remember who it was >> it was Mr. Vankovich >> said that they were in they were in land um and that they didn't have the facilities to lift a vessel a a 70ft vessel >> by crane and take it to and take it in land. >> It's day two page 13. It starts at line two. is Mr. And that is the only evidence on the record about on this question. >> I don't recollect that being challenged. >> No, I don't I don't think it was by a learner friend or he might have put that they he might have put in a general way that I shouldn't be fair to my friend. I think my learner friend put KJM could have cured the defects. >> Challenge about the >> the need for lifting tackle and bringing a 70ft boat in land. It would have to I I have some recollection of of a suggestion that it may have been done at somebody else's facility. I don't know. Um >> well, what Mr. Anchorage said is that KJN's facility is landlocked. So they'd had to have brought it out of the water and they didn't have the ability to do that. Um >> I'll look at the evidence on I'll look at the evidence. >> The third point which frankly is the answer to this point irrespective of what you think about the evidence is that the question isn't would it have been reasonable for KJM to cure the defects. The question is, is it irrational for contessor to said I think we should get the factory to fix this? And actually, Mr. Ivankovich gave the answer to this question at day two page 16 starting at line 14 which is that when you paid for a boat from a manufacturer you're paying for the yard to construct it to the the finishing a finished standard where it's complete. If you take it at a less than complete standard and do the work yourself, you're just paying twice for the same thing. And you might remember, your honor, >> Mr. Folks, it goes back to Mr. Folks again, doesn't it? >> It does. And you might remember that Mr. Vanovich said, "Well, you'd also have all these warranties." Again, we've not seen what the actual warranties are because they've not produced the contract. But you know the idea that KJM might be just doing work that would otherwise be under warranty like for instance the air conditioning is just commercial madness. So in my submission, it's almost unarguable to say that it is irrational for Contessa to say actually I don't want KGM to rectify the defects. They should be rectified by the art. So that's what I was going to say of breach. >> Yes. just very briefly on this question of a banana duty because I I don't resile for my case that actually um there is in fact no banana duty. I set out the authorities for your honor in section D1 and your your only has to consider this question of law if your honor is against me on the question of breach. But a few brief points. Firstly, my learn and friend said, well, this duty can arise either by construction or implication. And my answer to that is, well, if it's an exercise of construction, there has to be some language for you to construe. Here, all there is is contest sole discretion. And if that term is to be confined, it can only be done by implication. And therefore, you want to has to be satisfied. I mean, I find it hard to believe that where a document talks about a a party's sole discretion that um it's permitted to exercise that discretion irrationally. Well, um, for instance, if uh I mean there are rights that a party might have that it can exercise without any regard to the other party's interests or indeed for a reason that is um uh irrational like for instance a bare right to terminate. But I mean it's it's a commercial contract and looking at a commercial contract in in that context. Well, I I've I've said I'd take some persuading that that there wasn't a duty. >> Well, I the two points that I would urge on your honor this. The first is that in my submission, uh clause 2B is clearly for contest's sole benefit. It it's putting up the cash. hasn't seen the yacht. And what clause 2B is doing is giving contest essentially an option to say we pay when we are satisfied that the yacht is up to standard. And of course it takes the risk that um it having already outlaid 1.6 million that if it decides not to proceed it might lose that money. But if it's if it if if it's permitted irrationally uh to uh reject the yacht essentially that destroys the whole commercial purpose of the agreement because it just means it it it could walk away. >> Well, it's a bit but it's a bit like those authorities, isn't it? on uh that have held that there's no banana duty implied fettering uh a lender who lends on demand from demanding at any time it likes. And you might think well if I lend on day one and then I demand repayment on day 10 you know to some extent commercially the purpose of a loan might be destroyed completely. But the question is whe the question is about whether this is the sort of right that a party is just entitled to exercise when it wants to without any review by the court. But this is this is this is to facilitate the purchase of a yacht in relation to which KJM will have uh all things being equal. Um incurred uh liabilities to a third party. Uh a and what you're suggesting I is that that contest could just shrug his shoulders and say tough. Um I I'm walking away from this because I feel like it. I mean it doesn't make commercial sense to me. >> Well, you want to I I've set out my submissions in my skeleton. >> Well, I've told you my thoughts. >> Yes. I I'll I'll perhaps leave it there. Um so I'll move on um to deal with this question of waiver. >> Yes. >> And there is an important preliminary point here for your honor and that is what case is actually available to KJN in closing. And in my submission the only case that is available is that which is pleaded and it's worth just going back and looking at pleadings. It's at page 23. Thank you to the operator. And uh the P is at 39.2 and at little one, two, and three, you get the P in relation to the Banana duty, which we we've dealt with. And then at four there's a plea that Moren Co's request on 30th of July 2024 for wire instructions to advance the sums as envisaged under the loan agreement indicates that by that time Contessa was satisfied with the survey report and accepted the payment was due. KJM relied on that request in believing that the required sum would be paid by 3d of August. And then at little five it continues in the further alternative or co's request for wire instructions and mandator waiver the condition president such that condescent was obliged uh to advance 2.3 million when the further alternative the request for wire instructions gave rise to a stople that is it so the pleaded case is that moro's request Quest for wire instructions. And you can see the the express plea in relation to that actually at page 22. You can see it's paragraph 35. There's on 30th of July 2024 and co requested wire instructions for the transfer of 2.39 and 36 the same day. in reliance on in accordance with the request for wire instructions. KJN provided an invoice. That's the only thing that it that contest that that KJ is alleged to have done in reliance on the alleged uh representation is to have sent an invoice for payment of 2.39 million. So this is the case that is open to my learned friend in closing that 30th of July 2024 email. We'll come to look at it in a minute, but it's at well, it appears several places in the bundle, but 1296 fields note in my learning friend skeleton, as I outlined in my opening, there's an entirely new case. So, and it's a paragraph 43, supplementary bundle 104. We don't need to go there at the moment. Thank you. Um, but what what is said is it's a failure to say anything at all about the Apple report and then alleged promises to pay between October 2023 and March 2024. It's a totally different time frame. None of that you'll find anywhere in the pleading. And the case is well um KJM relied on those statements when it sent money to Sino Eagle. And because none of this is pleaded, it's not open to KJM to close on this basis. There's no application to amend, nor could there be. And the reason is that it would cause real prejudice to allow this case to be run now when it's not been pleaded. And I'll give you on just one example. The factual case, the new factual case is that KJN paid money to the shipyard in reliance on what was said in October and November and March. That is an issue. Just just on that. >> Yes. >> Is there any evidence anywhere of the price agreed between the shipyard and KJM for the vessel? Not that I'm aware of. And um their witnesses, neither Mr. Al Jasmine nor Mr. Hydra, I'm sure Mr. Page will correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't think either of them say this was the price that we agreed to pay. One would assume it was just less. It was the $3.9 million, but >> I don't make any assumptions. >> Well, neither do I. Um but to to just to finish this point off about why there would be real prejudice is because the factual case that's now run is that in reliance on what Minister of Ankovich said in October, November, March S KJM paid money to Sino Eagle that it would not otherwise have paid. And that is a factual question on which Contessa if it had been pleaded would have sought document production because it's very unclear what the actual payment schedule was and there's no evidence. >> Well, it's not a matter of unclear. We just don't have any evidence at all. >> No. and and there would there would surely have been internal emails and emails between so internal emails at KJM about making these payments or WhatsApps or whatever and they would be correspondents between the shipyard and KJM >> and presumably sorry running ahead slightly uh had Mr. Ivankovich been appointed a director of the company and had independent auditors been appointed the documents in relation to the transaction would have been available to Mr. Rebec >> potentially. I think there's a bit of a dispute between the parties about whether the uh this transaction between Contessa and KJN sort of falls under the umbrella of the JV. But I can't I'm not saying no to you on that. I'm saying that's that's not quite clear. It may have been as a matter of practical reality that he he would have had access to those documents. But to give an example, imagine for instance that that that KJM made those payments to Sino Eagle because that was the contractual uh payment schedule. Very difficult for KJM to say that it made those payments therefore in reliance on anything that Mr. Ivankovich has said. But we just don't know. And this is and and this is the consequence of of trying to take a new factual case in your skeleton. In fact, this whole waiver case was not addressed in my skeleton because the first time it it came was in the the skeleton argument is that >> we keep on we come we keep on coming back to uh and you'll gather that it's rather significant uh to me that there is no evidence of the contract between KJM and Sino Eagle. >> Yeah. I mean that's that's the source of all of this problem. >> It is and and and one of the reasons why there is no evidence about the the payment mechanics between KJN and Sino Eagle is because this point wasn't pleaded and was only taken in the skeleton and therefore contesta had no opportunity to seek document production about it. Yes. I mean that's how the broader question plays into this narrow question. >> Yes, it is. Your honor, it is. So in my submission, the only case that is open to KJM in closing is that which it is pleaded. And so I'm going to address that very briefly first. Um, what I thought I would do, your honor, is just quickly cover the law and then with an eye on the time, we might take a we're coming up to the 10-minute break. I might >> I might cover the law on waiver because I think I can do that quite quickly and then we can take a break and I'll >> carry on. Um, so I was going to take the law on waiver from my learned friend's skeleton because actually as I >> I'm sure he's flattered. I'm sure he's flattered by that. >> Well, I I'm going to say if I may with with respect to my learner friend that I don't disagree with anything that he says subject to one quibble. Um, it's at page 11 one. Sorry. Well, in the sub um it's page 25 of the skeleton is perhaps the easiest way of getting there for the EP. It's in the supplemental bundle at page 1103. So, Malona friends uh relies on three different types of waiver. Waiver by election, waiver by a stople and a stople by acquiescence. If I could ask the EP operator just to so you can see the entirety of power 42 that' be very helpful. Thank you. Now I don't disagree with anything that my learner friend says about what waiver by election means. My only quibble here is that this is not a case of waiver by election because election is where a party's got inconsistent rights and it makes a choice and the effect of that choice is to close off the exercise of any other rights. So if you've as my learning friend rightly says if if there's a breach and the innocent party chooses to affirm it loses its right to terminate for repudiation. So the friend statement of the law is entirely correct. It's just wholly irrelevant to the situation that I honor is dealing with. If there is any waiver here, it's waiver by a stopper, which is, as my learner friend quite accurately summarizes, requires essentially three things. an unequivocal representation by words or by conduct that the party doesn't intend to enforce his legal rights or doesn't intend to rely on uh part of the contract. So what your honor will be looking for is an unequivocal representation that clause 2B doesn't need to be applied. So contesttor is saying we will proceed as if clause 2B does not exist or doesn't need to be enforced. And then the other two legal requirements are there must be reliance. So the other party acts or desists from acting in reliance on that representation with the effect that it would be inequitable for the repres. I mean the authorities are a little unclear as to whether you need actual detriment but what they my what there has to be is some change of position on behalf of the representee to make it inequitable for the representtor to insist on his legal rights and finally my learning friend refers to a stople by acquiescence and now I would say I don't want to get too academic about this that this isn't actually um if one looks at the authority he cites and the critical paragraph is paragraph 52 of the FMT case. I'll just give you the reference in case you want to look at it. It's in the supplemental bundle at page 864 is that it's not actually a separate species of stoppable waiver. It's just that in certain circumstances if a party doesn't say anything that conduct can amount to an unequivocal representation. Pretty unusual and it's not the pleaded case. So your honor doesn't really need to worry about it. But that was all I was going to say about the law of waver. It's relatively clear and established. Um, I was going to move on to actually deal with the um the waiver case as pleaded. Now might be a convenient time for a 10-minute break. >> Yes. Uh, let's do that. Um, a bit less than 10 minutes. If we go to 25, uh, let's come back. Um, we can take a slightly longer break, perhaps even a shorter lunch. Um, let's uh come back at half past the hour. >> Okay. >> Okay. Thank you. >> Just wait for Mr. Paige. Let's proceed. you're on mute. >> It happens to each of us. Um I was going to deal with the three uh with the waiver case as actually pleaded. And I've got three short points. The first is that there was no unequivocal representation that clause 2B did not need to be complied with. And if we could ask the operator to go to page 135 in the bundle and just scroll down that bottom email. So this is the wire instructions email that is said to amount to the unequivocal representation. In my submission, it obviously is not. There's a a number of points. This email comes only a matter of days after Casey Flipman has sent that email that I showed you on her earlier at page 1302. we don't need to go there now where she says the report's not satisfactory. Uh it's a year out of date. It's obvious that what what's going on is Mr. Ivankovic is stepping in and saying look I and this is an attempt to save the transaction. I will buy this boat personally from the shipyard. That's why Michael Moore says provide draft documents saying the vessel will be transferred upon receipt of payment to Steven Ivankovich or a signs. And it's why he's asking for wire instructions because by July 2024, the Ivankovich family have have sent over three and a half if not close to four million dollars in total to KJM. They don't need wire instructions to send things to KJM. What they're after is the wire instructions of the shipyard. And it's obvious that it's understood by KJM what's going on. Because if I can just ask the operator to scroll up, you get Muhammad Radwan's response. And his first response is well in accordance with the loan agreement the contractual route is to wire the balance to us. But then he says this is about third lines down in case contested research would like to have the yacht under the name Steven kindly direct the purchase to the factory and KJM will process all the documentation. So he's he gets that what he's saying is if what you want to do is just buy this yacht process all documentation you know we we'll deal with that and what's the final email in this exchange you have seen it I think now a number of times it's at 1323 which is the the the last exchange it's from Michael and he says well Steven is still willing to close. Um, but what you need to do is give us the name and contact information for someone at the yard and let us do a pre-ely inspection. Then my submission when your honor stands back, there's no representation, let alone an unequivocal representation, that somehow clause 2B doesn't matter or isn't being relied on at this stage. Frankly, the loan agreement is has fallen away. It hasn't been complied with. This is about Steven saying, "Well, I'll I'll step in." I mean, you my thing, your honor, is very revealing that we weren't put in touch with anybody at the yard. Maybe that goes to your honor's query about whether there really was a sale contract. >> Yes. So, the response to this email, >> there is a So there's no response. >> There is no response. >> And the termination just I've got the chronology termination >> the letter from Sino Eagle where they say they are terminating is on the 9th of August. That's at page 1282. >> So what correspondence is there between this? >> There isn't there isn't any. >> So this is this is the 2nd of August. It's the American date. >> Yeah. >> Okay. >> And then >> there's no there's there's nothing between then the 2nd and 9th of August. >> No. So you say that this letter or this email? >> Well, I I don't I I'm just showing it to you, your your honor, so your honor has got the chronology. Yes, but I mean what you say sorry just you say the context I is well item three that Mr. Ivankovich is saying I I will I will buy if it's delivered to me. >> Yes. Sorry. Yes. Sorry. Yes. You're looking at that letter. Yes. >> And nothing happens in relation to that. >> No. There's no response to this either. Okay. So the first point is no unequivocal representation. And the second point and this is if I can put it in these colloquial terms the killer is that there is no reliance on the wire transfer email. Neither Mr. Al Jazzby nor Mr. Hydra say anywhere in their witness statements that they relied on the wire transfer email. That's just fatal. >> But coming to the context of it, you say that the wire transfer email was in the context of Mr. Ivankovich purchasing >> Europe. Yes. Yeah. So it it um but this is this is to even if you're on a thought that the wire transfer email could be a a waiver in some way there's no reliance and and more importantly there's no change of position by KJM in any way because by this point whatever KJM has paid to Sino Eagle it's already been paid. So this wire transfer email, KJM doesn't do anything, nothing meaningful anyway. It sends an invoice, but it doesn't do anything in response to that email. So there's so even if it was a a representation and even if there were evidence of reliance, there's nothing that makes it inequitable for contests to say no, these are the terms of the agreement. And that I might say parenthetically that's why to give him his credit and friend is trying to run this new case because he knows that the case that's pleaded just doesn't work on the facts because there's no reliance and there's no there's no KGM doesn't change its position in response to this email. That's why the if there's going to be a waiver, the case has to be well KGM paid some money in response to what Steven said. But that case is not not pleased. As I say, the third point just very briefly on this waiver point is you've got the contractual clause. I won't go back to it. I'll just give you my submissions very briefly on it. Um the clause deals with modifications and amendments. So it's it's plainly wider than just a variation. So it deals with modifications in my submission that's wide enough to include a waiver. That's the first point. And uh in relation to rock advertising, it doesn't help my learner friend because actually the test and he took you to it in opening. It's paragraph 16, page 728 of the supplemental. We don't need to go there. But the very last sentences of that paragraph, Lord Sumption makes clear that whilst waiver and estoppel can be an answer to these sorts of clauses, you need a representation that the party isn't going to rely on the informal modification clause. So, and he says that the the original wave or restopple that would be defeated by the clause can't be that representation. The party has to go even further. So, imagine we had a contract you and I said to you in writing, I'm not going to rely on clause 2B and don't worry about clause 15. I'm not going to rely on that either. And you want to paid some money or something in reliance on that statement. That might be enough but that's not even alleged here. Now I will just very briefly in case you want to contrary to my submissions considers the case open to KJM just deal with the unpleted waiver case. I can do it very very quickly if we could just go in the supplemental bundle to page 1104. This is my learned friend's skeleton. And we scroll down a bit further, please. And we've got ABC. And if we can just can we fit them all on the page. D. So these are the alleged representations. I just deal with them very quickly. A is an email from KJM to Steven. So that can't be a representation by Contessa. two at B is a WhatsApp message. That's a message that says payment is ready to be set up, but it doesn't say when any payment is going to be made and it says nothing about the contractual terms. So that's not an unequivocal representation. C. So this is the third one that's relied on an email from Muhammad to Steven of 8th of March. That's an email from KJM. So that's not a representation by Steven. And in any event that records that Steven was making the the payments for the Aquilla conditional on something. So that's not a waiver by Contessa of anything. It's not Contessa saying we are definitely going to pay. If anything, it's Contessa making clear it's not. And then finally at D, um there's an email about liquidation and freeing up capital. Again, it's not talking it's not saying there's no need to comply with the agreement. And in any event, your honor, there is no evidence before the court that KJM relied on any of these things when it paid money to sign an eagle. Mr. Al Jasmine doesn't say that. Mr. Haidraala doesn't say that. There's no evidence of reliance. And your honor and I have already talked about the absence of any documentary evidence about why those payments were made. there just isn't it. So for all those reasons you are Contessa wasn't obliged to lend. There's no breach. The issue then is an obligation to repay. We could just go to the uh trial bundle now page 9004. And um this is the issue about the obligation to repay. Um the obligation to repay is under clause five. In the event the vessel is not purchased by KJM, KJM shall return all funds. The construction of that is clear. There is an obligation to repay and it is conditional simply on the vessel not being purchased. And that's consistent with clause 4 A. But I mean the case against you is on its proper construction. Uh that means that uh if KJM decides uh not to purchase, not that the the um uh the purchase falls through due to default on the part of your client. But you, your honor, your honor is only considering this issue if your honor has concluded that there is no fault because actually um the way this contract works is quite clear. The loan always has to be repaid unless Contessa commits a breach. And that is because the loan is either repaid because the yacht is purchased and sold or the yacht is not purchased and then clause five kicks in. And then if we go over the page on page 9005, there's clause 6B which says contestant be deemed to be in default upon the occurrence of any of the following events. Failure to make timely payment money. In the event of default by contessa and failure to cure, KJN may elect to do any of the following. Sell the yacht and retain any payments. So the contract is clear. The only circumstance in which the loan monies are not repayable is if there is a breach by contessor and your own your honor is only considering my claim for repayment of the advance if your honor has concluded that there is no breach by contestant. Then in those circumstances the contract is clear. If the vessel is not purchased, the loan has to be repaid. And this must have been contemplated by the parties because the parties have agreed that contessor will have a discretion about whether a report is is not satisfactory. And so the parties must have contemplated that there could be circumstances in which Contessa says this report is not satisfactory. And what happens then? Well, the contract is very clear. If the vessel is not purchased, KJM shall return the funds. There's the um submission, your honor, that contestant didn't in fact make payment and that is in some way relevant. Um, KGN says, "Well, Contessa has to prove its loss." The obvious answer to that is no, it doesn't because clause five gives rise to a debt claim, not a claim in damages, because there is a an express contractual obligation to return the funds. And in any event, as I made clear in opening, this case is just not open to KJM because they positively plead that Contessa paid the first branch and that is in the defense encounter claim paragraph nine at page 19 of the bundle. So um there's just notice available to my friend. If your honor is a I should say there's an issue about interest. Um it's addressed in my skeleton. I don't propose to say anything more about it at this stage. If your honor is against me and your honor concludes that there is a breach then I accept that my learner friend in principle has a counter KGM I should say has a counter claim uh for damages. The question is can it prove any loss and uh the loss is put in two ways. There's a lot of profit claim that's if we go back to the supplemental bundle page 107. This is the way that my learner friend puts his uh loss of profit claim. There's absolutely none of this. If we just scroll down a bit further, please, so we can see the table, he gives his calculation. None of this is pleaded, but I just want to walk your honor through it. So, what is said is that your honor can infer the likely market sale price from one paragraph of Mr. Al Jasm's witness statement. Um, and one WhatsApp, which is the the second bullet point. Um, you want to know absolutely nothing about those I'm going to put them in inverted commas offers. You don't even know the name of who apparently made those offers. Nothing about their means. I mean, anyone can make an offer. I can go down to the Excel Center for the next yaching convention, make an offer to buy a vessel for 11.5 million. that doesn't set the market price unless I'm a credible buyer. So, your honor's got no expert evidence about the retail price for these boats, no expert evidence about the market. Um, there is for the first time proposed a notional sale date of 31st of January 2024. That's not pleaded. But, but why the 31st of January 2024? We didn't even have the corrective actions report until the 29th of February. There's just no real case on when this boat should have been sold. Um it's agreed by everybody that in this calculation one would need to deduct selling expenses. That's his stage two. And KJM allows $20,000 for three months. And if one looks at the footnote, um this is similar to storage costs charged by Sinoe Eagle. Well, what are storage costs charged by Sino of Eagle got to do with the selling expenses of a yacht? I mean, my friend, this is Sorry, your honor. This is the back of the packet. Your honor has no uh proper case supported by evidence as to what profit KJN would have made if in fact this boat could have been sold. So your honor must just dismiss that claim for loss. And then the only other uh claim for loss is the monies that were paid to KJF to Sino Eagle. Um we've discussed this at length. There's no evidence that that was forfeited. And that's >> there's no evidence that the figures at 51 were paid in respect of this vessel. >> There's certainly no documentary evidence to that effect. And then um in any event we would say and it set out in my skeleton the 1.6 million came from Contessa. And if that money is well and truly gone, that's a loss that Contessa has suffered because the effect of the breach is to relieve KGM of the obligation to repay that money to Contessa. So if Contessa's if KJM has lost 1.6 million to Sino Eld as a result of this breach, it's also been relieved of the obligation to repay that money to Contessa. So it's neutral. So the loss could only be about 240,000. That one was everything that I was going to say about the loan claim. >> Yes, >> I was going going to move on very quickly to the JB claim. I'm I'm very conscious of of timing. I may need to seek your honor's indulgence for an extra 10 minutes or so. >> Just before Mr. Watson does move on. I I just want to check whether he does have anything to say about why interest should acrue from 26th of May 2023. Obviously a matter for him, but just want to flag that's a point that hasn't been addressed anyway yet. I can address it in reply if I need to. Um on the JV claim then your honor the first question is termination and I'm going to adopt the same headings that I adopted in my opening for the various ways in which the termination case is put. The first is about the relationship to the chapter 11 companies um because it's their entry into chapter 11 that is said to trigger the right to terminate. Now, Mr. Ivankovic's evidence is that he doesn't own them. They're not his assets. His evidence was that payments had to be signed off by his father. That's day two, page 139, line 22. There's no documentary evidence anywhere that these uh companies are owned by him or that these their assets are owned by him. Indeed, the chapter 11 proceedings had um his father Anthony and his mother Olga as the plan proponents. That's a page 1647. So Melon Friend's case is entirely inferential and based on Mr. Ivankovich's ability to procure payment, but that's not good enough um to make good the case. your honor, as perhaps I will as well, be familiar with, for instance, the son of a wealthy Emirati. And he walks into a showroom and says, "I'd like to buy that sports car." And the dealer says, "Yes, that's fine." And the son of the wealthy Emirati phones his father and says, "I want to buy a sports car." And father talks to his people and a company somewhere makes a payment to purchase the sports car. Now just because the son in that example is able to call on the family wealth under the control of the patriarch does not in any legal sense uh render the companies as belonging to the son nor indeed their assets. So the mere fact that Mr. Vankovich is able to ask his father or his father's staff in probably to to procure payments on his behalf does not tell you anything about ownership. That case in my submission just doesn't work. Let's just look at the clauses that are relied on very briefly back in the trial bundle page 886. And so the first clause that's relied on is uh K A3 and none of this is engaged. So if we just go through it um uh briefly if any venturer makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors well that's not happened or petitions for the appointment of a trustee or receiver of the venturer or any substantial portion of the assets. So there has to be a petition for the appointment of trustee or receiver either over the venturer or the venturer's assets. There was never a trustee or receiver because the debtors remained in possession. That's page 1651 of the chapter 11 order. So that's not satisfied. And then it's if any venturer commences any proceeding pursuant to any bankruptcy blah blah blah that's got to be commences proceedings in relation to their own bankruptcy reorganization arrangement or insolveny. It can't preclude a venturer from say as creditor bringing proceedings. It's got to be about the venturer commencing their own proceedings. And the venturer here is Stephen Ivankovic personally. He has never commenced any proceedings personally. The chapter 11 companies commence the proceedings. That's 1651. And your honor can't just ignore separate legal personality in that way. Moderna friend says, "Well, Steven should be treated as the effective applicant because his divorce proceedings caused the chapter 11." But that doesn't satisfy the requirements of this clause. So that doesn't work. The other clause that's relied on is J A3. If I could just ask the operator to scroll up. Sorry. Um, it's there. That's it at the bottom of the screen there. So, there has to be a material change in the venturers's management, business, assets, or company structure. If your honor is with me that actually these companies aren't Steven Ivankovic's business or assets or company structure, he's associated with them, but they're not his. That clause isn't satisfied. In any event, there has to be a material change and we both agree that material is material to the performance of the JV. And my learner friend can point to no obligation in the JV agreement after the chapter 11 that Mr. Ivankovich is unable to perform. So in my submission, this clause isn't satisfied either. Moving on to the divorce orders, um just for your your honor's notes, um the three orders are at page 898 10971099. Again, the clause that's relied upon is this clause JB3. So once again there has to be a material change to Stephen in the required way. >> What was the third? A third one was 1099. >> 1099. That's the body attachment order. I think at this point I should just make a correction to my skeleton because I think I said at page 149 that the that the 425K had been paid before the contempt order and Mr. Ankovich clarified in his or all evidence that that wasn't right. So I withdraw that part of my skeleton. But it it makes no difference because the money order was made in May 2023. So that is before Mr. Ivankovic procured the payment of the 2.25 million to the JV. So there is no basis to say that the making of that um order in any way materially affected Mr. Ivankovic's ability to perform the JV. His principal obligation was to pay in cash contributions and he paid them. These orders were just found long after the event and they're being deployed now. It's not a ground of any real substance. That brings um me on to the question of late payments. And there are really two points. Firstly, that the payments were not late. And secondly, that in any event, the defaults were cured. on lateness. Let's just go to page 882. Uh so the initial contribution had to be made within 30 days of the execution of the agreement and uh you see that at se at the top. This is the the two million bullet payment I think as my learn friend put it in in cross and and Mr. Ivankovich's answer was well I couldn't make the payment until KJI had been incorporated and it was put to Mr. Ankovich that the contract didn't stipulate that payment had to be made to an to um KJI and that is flatly wrong because you can see from uh clause it's another clause C but it's just above clause D additional contributions that I's initial contribution shall be an interestfree shareholders loan now who is the shareholder making the loan to KJI to So the parties agreed that the form of the initial contribution isn't just a payment of money in a in an amorphous sense. It is a loan to KJI. And how can Mr. Ivankovich make a loan to a company that does not exist? KJI was not incorporated until July 2023 and by then there had already been the variations to uh this JV agreement. So there was no initial breach as my learner friend likes to suggest. Let's just quickly go to the variation that matters which is at 93. The first uh tranch was due on the June the 19th. Everyone accepts it's three days late. I don't think my learner friends suggest that's a breach because clause KA1 requires a default that lasts at least 14 days. So that's just irrelevant. The real question if we go over to page 914 is when these two tranches are due and the first is due within five business days of obtaining all the approvals for the buildup. Now my learner friend suggested in cross-examination that that just meant the industrial license but it obviously doesn't because one only has to look up to see that it's regul under licensing for instance regulatory and operational licenses including but not limited to the whole series of licenses. And if we go up again again under construction consultancy and associated logistics there are mandatory pre-approvals for municipalities civil defense and DWA and what's the significance of this for your honor? Well if KJM is going to advance a case that Mr. of Ankovich was in default. It has to be able to satisfy your honor as to when the due date was and it has not aduced any well, let's take this in stages. There is no pleaded case about when tranch 2 was due. What does upon obtaining all approvals for the buildup actually mean? No case on that, but there's no evidence about it either. It obviously means more than just the industrial license. No evidence. So KJM cannot show that Mr. Ivankovich paid late. And the same is true with the mold arrivals. The case seems to have been that Mr. Ivankovich agreed to provide the physical molds, didn't and so KJM just used some other models. And your honor might recall in cross-examination I showed how in the original JV agreement there's no obligation on Mr. Ivankovich to provide physical molds. His obligation was to provide the capital for the molds. So what you get actually in fact is an email at 1137 which is where this money is demanded. We don't need to turn to it, but I'll just very briefly give my submissions on it where essentially KJM says, "We're just going to use our own our own molds and now you need to pay us some money." I mean, that is a party unilaterally changing the terms of the bargain. It does not establish that money was in fact contractually due. But in any event, all of this is to some extent irrelevant for your honor because there is no dispute between the parties that all the money was in fact paid. So the only question is could they lawfully terminate as a result of these delays? And the answer to that is no. Because if we go to page 886 back in the JVA, KAB is very clear, should an event of default occur and continue beyond any grace period, the non-defaulting party shall at its election have the right to exercise one of the following remedies to terminate. So the contractual remedy of termination only arises if one an event of default occurs. So there has to be money due and then a demand at a period of 14 days when it's not paid. And then that default has to continue beyond any grace period. And the obvious uh meaning of that is that the default has to be continuing when the right is exercised. It's very common in commercial agreements where there's an event of default provision for the right for for various rights consequent upon the event of default to be exercisable only if the if the default is continuing and my learner friend says well um that's wrong because once the right to terminate has arisen it cannot be lost um and here unfortunately he is wrong about the law and I'll just take you back to his skeleton. >> Well, sorry, let's just can we just uh unravel this slightly? >> So, if there's reliance on KA1, then there has to be a demand and the default continues for 14 days thereafter before you can go to >> KB. Yeah. >> So, where is the demand >> that's relied upon? Well, I I might I might leave that to my learner friend because >> okay >> because if you think about it, your honor, firstly KJM has to say money is due on a particular day and then it has to say after that day we made a demand and then there has to be a default continuing for a period of 14 days. Um, my submission is they don't even have a case, let alone evidence of when the money is due before you even get to the question of demands. So, I'll leave my loaner friend to see how he wants to put his case. >> But whatever the answer to all of that, >> they couldn't terminate in December. Sorry, they couldn't terminate in September 2024 for a default that had been cured in December 2023 because KAB requires the default to be continuing. And if we go to my learner friends skeleton argument in the supplemental bundle at page 11 one9 friends cites the decision in supermax but you can see from the quotation that is extracted that supermax is dealing with a case of repudiatory breach. That's a situation where a party exercises its common law right to terminate. And there I agree once a party has committed a repudiatory breach, a party's entitled, the innocent party is entitled to terminate unless and until it affirms. But there's no case here of repudiatory breach. The case is quite squarely termination under a contractual provision. That's the defense encounter claim paragraph 42.2 page 550 in the trial bundle. We don't need to go there. Fact there is no reference to repudiatory breach anywhere in the defense and counter claim. So my friend KJM cannot run a case of repudiatory breach now because it would need to be pleaded. There would need to be an investigation into whether those late payments were repudiatory. And I would be entitled to run a case of affirmation because the party that just leaves a contract in existence for uh nine months I would say in my submission affirms but your honor doesn't need to get into it because there's no question of repudiation alleged. The only issue is was there a valid termination under the contractual provision and the contractual provision quite clearly requires um there to be a continuing default. And if you're on a needed authority for that um you've got in the bundle Lewis paragraph 17.126. We don't need to go there. It's in the supplemental bundle at 1 033. If you terminate under a contractual provision, there must quote be substantive compliance with the contractual provisions. So the fact that any default if there was one has been cured is a complete answer to that ground. We come on to then the additional contributions. This is the the renewal of the lease and the industrial license. The case is put if we go back to the main trial bundle on 882. The case is put if we sorry 882. That's my fault. Thank you. uh under little D there in the middle any additional contribution which should be required by either venturer must be approved by each venture unanimously. There was never any approval by Mr. Ivankovich to make any additional contribution beyond the 2 million. That is the complete answer to this case. Indeed, it wasn't even put to Mr. Ivankovich that he agreed to make any kind of contribution. It was put to him that there was a need to pay. That was day two, page 165. That need to pay is irrelevant. It was suggested it would be commercially unreasonable for him not to agree, but that's irrelevant as well. What matters is an agreement. There's not even a pleaded case about an agreement. But if your honor overlooks that for the moment, there's no evidence anywhere of any agreement by his. And so that in my submission is the complete answer to that additional contribution fee. I will move now just um to deal very briefly with the question of remedies because once you've answered those four questions there's no ground to terminate so the JVA remains on force in force and the question is simply whether you should enforce it and here the answer comes back from KGM is to say well the memorandum of association superseded the JVA that's the way the case is put again bit of a theme here not a point that's ever been pleaded but in any event it's wrong I can deal with it like this we just go to the JVA the the MOA at page 1038 what is this document this is the constitutional document for KJI it's its articles of association it says in it. Nowhere does it say in it that it supersedes the J agreement. It doesn't even refer to the JV agreement. There is nothing in Dubai law or indeed in English law uh problematic about forming a company having articles of association and then having a separate contract between shareholders about how they will exercise their rights. And that is exactly what the parties have done in the JV. So if we go back to the JV for a moment, what have the parties agreed? If we go back to page 884, say, we can see what the parties have agreed. They've agreed that there will be three directors. Um they have agreed on the previous page at 883 how profits are going to be shared between them. And at 885 there's an agreement about the books and records and about a bianual audit. And this is why the uh enforcement your honor of the JVA is so important because Mr. Ivankovich obviously has the Dubai law rights that he has as a shareholder of KJI. He's got those already. But what the JV agreement gives him are additional contractual rights. The parties have bargained for more. How does this work contractually? You your honor might be thinking. Well, the answer is to be found as it usually is in Chitty. And if we go into the supplemental bundle at page 999, you get um implied Sorry. >> 9999. >> Yeah. >> Where you go in an emergency cooperation, you get the classic statement of the rule. As a general rule, where in a written contract it appears that both parties have agreed that something shall be done, which cannot effectively be done unless both concurred in doing it. The construction of a contract is that each agrees to do all that is necessary to be done on his part for the carrying out of that thing, though there may be no express words to that effect. That's a classic statement. If we just go over the page, the editors note, notwithstanding the reference of a general rule, the term is not an inevitable feature of a commercial contract. The requirements for the implication of a term into a contract must still be satisfied before the implication be made. the term is most likely to be applied where positive cooperation between the parties is required to bring about a particular end contemplated by the contract. So let's take an example of the practical significance of this and actually your honor perhaps unwittingly uh in cross-examinate in Mr. Al Jasm's cross-examination got to the very heart of this. How does Mr. Ivankovic become a director of KJI? There has to be a general assembly meeting and there has to be more than 50% of the votes which means KJM has to vote in favor of Mr. Ivankovic's appointment as a director of KJR. So if we go back for the moment to page 884 in sorry in the main art. What is the proper construction of clause FA? It is a contractual promise by KJM to do all things that are necessary to procure that result. And the result is that Steven Ivankovic is a director of KJI. And what does that require? It requires KJM to vote in favor of Mr. Ivankovich's appointment at a general assembly. And that is a contractual obligation that your honor can enforce by way of specific performance. And that is what the JVA claim seeks. And that's the way and that that if I might say standing back is the logic behind the JV claim because the way it was put by Malone in closing is to say well your honor shouldn't be making orders to make these people work together and that is not what the JVA claim seeks. What it seeks to do is orders compelling KJM to perform those bits of this agreement that it should have already been performing to put Mr. Ivankovich in the practical position that he should have today that he should have been in from the start. That is a director. He is a director. there is a proper auditor and he's got access to the books and records and your honor can achieve that result by specifically performing this contract. Now I know >> I don't know why you said that my uh intervention was uh inadvertent. >> I I I don't I I I didn't just teasing. Yeah, it may suggest it was inadvertent, but I think your honor had grasped the heart of the matter. Um, there >> well, this is a shareholders agreement. >> Shareholders agreement typically >> has to be enforced. Well, not just have to be enforced with shareholders agreements govern the rights between the shareholders >> and and and and if a shareholder doesn't do what doesn't procure the result that is provided for in the shareholders agreement the court can enforce it by specific performance. Now in opening my learn and friend said and I quote that the pleaded case only gives a hint sorry he said a small hint of what has actually emerged in the draft order. That was day one page 41 line 32 that is just wrong. And if we just go to page 534 in the bundle, these are my particulars of claim from September 2024. You can see a paragraph 44 there's there's the claim for a declaration as determination. And then I'd encourage your honor um when your honor is writing his judgment to read on claim two appointment of directors. You see over two pages set out the basis for the orders that are sought. If you just scroll over page 47 um sorry paragraph 47 the particular in particular the claim and claims orders that and then all the orders that are claimed by way of specific performance are set out. Uh if we continue to scroll down you've got the auditors. Scroll down even more. Keep going. Keep going. Keep going. There's a lot of pleading. There we go. Claim for provision of documents. The pleading is longer than the order. So Malone can't say that he's in any way surprised about the relief that's being sought because over more than five pages of pleading, the relief has been set out. The reality is that KJM just has no answer other than its termination point as to why this relief should be granted shouldn't be granted. I'll turn now at the end just very quickly to KJM's counter claim. I've dealt with most of the alleged breaches already. The only breach that isn't relied on for termination, but it's still said to be a breach, is a breach of Mr. Ivankovich's obligation to market and sell vessels. That's if we look at page 884 of the bundle here. This is the contractual obligation. It's you see the heading Ivankovich. You see the the ventures agree to a division of authority between themselves under Ivankovich. You've got Ivankovich to manage his own business. And then this is the term that's relied on. Ivankovich will be in charge of marketing and the sale of the vessels in the Middle East and the United States America according to his business practices and experience. This is a term that Mr. Vanovich is alleged to have breached. Now obviously I would say firstly this doesn't impose on him an obligation to market and sell. It simply says he's in charge of it. Two, there is no evidence before this court that there were any vessels to market or sell that Mr. Vanovich failed to do. Indeed, it wasn't even put to Mr. Imacovich that he failed to market and sell vessels. So perhaps this case has actually been abandoned. And then three, how could Mr. Ivankovic market and sell on behalf of KJI when he's not been appointed a director? I mean, how, for instance, could he commit KJI to a sale contract selling a vessel when he's not a director of KJI. So, there's that breach, which is the only breach that's asserted that, as I say, isn't relied on for termination. But in my submission, that case is bad. If your honor does find a breach, then your honor have to consider the question of relief and it's put on two grounds. The first KJM seeks a sum of money. Now, the only pleaded case and this is at page 548 in the bundle. This is the defense and counter claim. You can see here there's a little table setting out the obligation and the payments. And you see the only the only payment he hasn't made it is said is that 873974. Do you see that next to the August 2024? And that's why it said that the balance outstanding is just $238,000. So the only sum of money that it is alleged that Mr. Ivankovich owes either to KGN or to KJI is that $238,000. That's the renewal of the factory license and the lease and I've already made my submissions about why he is not liable to pay that because there was no agreement to pay it and it requires an agreement. Now my learn friend skeleton band is a whole series of other figures around they're not pleaded and therefore they're not open to them and that's the simple answer to that and then there's a loss of profit claim and it KJM I think candidly accepts that there's been no disclosure there's no evidence it hasn't got a case and so I think what's asked for is um some process after this trial to try and determine what the loss of profit actually is. That in my submission is not an appropriate way to proceed. A claimant and for the purpose of this counter claim KGM is a claimant cannot just turn up at trial and say well I haven't got any evidence. I haven't put my case together so can I have another go please. Um, if KJM actually wanted to advance a loss of profit case, it had to do so at this trial or seek a direction well in advance for a split trial and it hasn't done that. But as I say, your honor doesn't really get to any of this because there are no uh breaches that have been established. That, your honor, I think brings me very neatly to the agreed time for lunch at 10:30 in the UK. Unless your honor has um any questions for me that are usefully dealt with. Now, your honor might have questions for both of us that you want to pose at the end of closing. I'm sort of entirely in your honor's hands. >> No, I I I have nothing at the moment. Uh what I'm minded to do uh unless there's any uh great objection is take a slightly shorter lunch today. We don't have witnesses. Um so I was wondering if we could take 45 minutes and uh resume then at 2:15 Dubai time. Are there any reasons that's not practicable on either side? You just want to check with your your teams. >> You're we are content with that. >> Okay. Well, let's let's resume then at uh 2:15 by 11:15. Sorry, just before we we break, I should just um clarified what I meant to say at the outset of the hearing, which is that I anticipate I'll only need 10 to 15 minutes, if that, by way of reply. >> Okay. But anyway, let's let's keep let's keep disciplined on it. So, okay. Um 11:15 UK, 2:15 Dubai. >> I'm great. >> Thank you very much. Okay, ready to proceed? Yes, your honor. What I propose to do in my uh closings is to um look at the construction of the loan agreement uh first. Uh then we'll come on to clause 2B uh itself and the propanza duty that sits in with that. Then we look at the question of breach. Then we look at the factual question about receipt of the survey. uh next waiver uh and then uh the repayment issue deposit and counter claim and then finally the JV claim and I think just as uh with Mr. Watson uh I propose to spend probably twothird or so of my time on the contested claim and then some of the factual material which emerges there follows through into the JV claim which we can deal with relatively briefly. So before we then stick into the um loan agreement, the the the headline edition from my client uh is and uh remains that uh Mr. Anankovich uh overextended himself and ran out of money and that's why uh both claims uh have uh come before this court. Um it's not in reality down to any deficiency in the survey or any other procedural failing. And the absence of cash is why the uh balance was never paid and the absence of cash is why uh the the joint venture was starved of funds and uh and has now collapsed. Um Mr. Vankovich has presented himself to the court as a man with bottomless resources. That simply doesn't ring true with the contemporaneist documents. uh we can look just at uh three or four quick examples before we get into detail for this. Uh the first is uh page 1201 of the bundle and this is an email we looked at a number of times in Mr. Ivankovich's evidence. Uh and uh your honor may uh recall the bottom bullet point there uh is Mr. Vankovich saying that the um a negative delta in his liquidity has been created by the absence of sailing the sunseker. So in re what that means in layman's terms is that uh he uh through his family's companies had overextended himself with a sunseeker uh that had not sold. There was 11.5 million out. Um the fact that it was in cash perhaps reinforces a point rather than undermines it. Uh and they simply didn't have the free cash available to start making these other investments. So everything else was on a go slow pending a profitable sale of the Sunseeker. We learned that it was marketed intensively through the autumn and winter of 2023 and that offers weren't received which met Mr. Bank satisfaction. That's all the matter for him. Um but the effect of that was that there was no free cash available um to to uh comply with his contractual obligations through to KJM. We've also seen in the uh divorce proceedings in the chapter 11 proceedings uh that there have been mounting financial difficulties for Mr. Vanovich as well leading to a contempt finding that's at page 1097 of the bundle uh and a warrant for his arrest at 1099. Uh and indeed I understood Mr. Evang saying in his evidence that that uh the money was not paid to purge that contempt. It simply elapsed as a matter of through through the passage of time. Um we also know uh that the divorce proceedings triggered the chapter 11 uh insolvency and uh that was a finding of fact uh made in in perhaps the the one clear statement one can read from the uh bankruptcy judgment at page 1665 in the little footnote at the bottom of that page. Um there is no doubt that rulings in the Illinois divorce proceedings precipitated these bankruptcy filings. Uh and uh in a sense the the ploy of the chapter 11 bankruptcy didn't work because u janessic's uh interests are preserved uh through the bankruptcy process as well. But one can see there from this comment that this is why there had been an objection to it. Um she was one of the objecting creditors as I understand it. Um so it's those factors rather than uh an unsatisfactory survey or any lack of transparency that triggered the events which uh in fact followed. Now turning on then to the loan agreement itself and I I couldn't help but note with interest that um Mr. Watson's original structure in his opening dealt with a construction of contract at a different point uh to his closing. in his closing he comes to it last uh and uh with respect I can well understand that because the the structure of the contract uh uh is is something which does not help him uh and it helps my clients in a number of different ways. Um so of course one uh approaches the construction of a contract through the well-known authorities of wooden capital and court won't even be reminding um of all of those principles. Um the point I made in opening is that though styled as a loan, it has the architecture of a profit sharing commercial venture. And it's that architecture that informs clause 2B. So what I invite your honor to do is just um uh walk with me uh through the contract itself and we'll look at some key points within it. I should say, excuse me, the the bundle references page 255. >> Uh, I'm on 9004. >> Oh, sorry. Yes. Uh, I've reversed back to my original markup. 904. Yes. So 904 uh clause one uh records that the uh purpose of the loan is to be used for the purchase of the vessel from Sino Eagle Yachts uh Inc. Uh it's a named vessel that we see at the preamble and the specifications are set out in exhibit A. uh the uh at the end of clause one there we have a direct reference to Mr. Vanovich. It's saying that the purchase of the festival will be for and on behalf of Steven Avangovich aka Tom Tessa and the structure was for KJM to be the purchaser uh and uh then to be the retailer and to sell it onwards with contestant effectively being the financier. the proceeds of sale, we can skip ahead to that point and then come back are at dealt with at clause 7B um with a top slice of contessor receiving its cash back and then a profit sharing agreement of 6040. So we also have back at clause three of the contract an express statement that this is to be an interest free loan. Now there is nothing in the contract itself dealing with interest uh in the event that the uh uh vessel isn't purchased. that on a proper construction I say of the contract we can deal with the interest points very quickly that this was an interest free loan uh and uh the the only route for a commercial return um for contesta was that the vessel would be purchased and sold onwards for a profit and it doesn't have a a back stop of uh of treating this money as as a simple debt that that is acuring interest. So we have an interest free loan um repayable on this commercial basis where the parties share the upside 6040 in uh Contessa's favor. Uh and the risk allocation is made clear through the the structure of loan of clause two. The basic concept is that the 1.6 6 million has already been paid over by the date that this contract has been signed and that is a sunk cost and not intended unless it's KJM uh that decides not to proceed with the purchase of the vessel. The payment of the 1.6 6 million is not linked in any way to the survey report nor is a refund of the 1.6 million linked in any way to the survey report. As I say, we know that payment pred predates uh the contract. predict a survey and there is no pleaded case nor any case put forward in argument that uh an implied term which should be read into clause 2B uh requiring KGM to commission a survey within a reasonable period of time present this to contest and to do any other steps linked to 2B that would then mean that that there is an obligation to repay the loan if some causes of 2B are not satisfied. Instead, what happens through 2B is the obligation of contestant to pay over the balance arises as part of a three-stage process. The first is when the uh a survey is provided. So it's clearly open to contestant to say that the survey isn't required but this is about contesta's contractual obligation of a balance uh under the terms of the contract as originally written. Um so KGM has to provide a survey. Contessa then decides whether or not it's a satisfactory report and Contessa then pays over the money within 5 days of receiving the report report if it is satisfactory. Now, plainly within clause 2B, the parties contemplated a possibility that KJM would hand over an unsatisfactory report. If that happens, Contessa is then under no obligation to pay over the balance of the money. And KGM for its part has denied the prospect of first of all recovering its expenses and secondly defined denied the prospect of earning a profit. So Contessa is given the option of walking away at that point but there's no obligation on KJM in this scenario to return the 1.6 million. And if the parties had wanted to impose an obligation on KGM to return the 1.6 million in the event that an unsatisfactory survey uh was provided, then the parties readily could have inserted relevant language in clauses for clause 7. And indeed we can contrast that with >> what happens to the 1.6 million. >> So the 1.6 million is a self cost. >> I'm sorry. What' you say? It >> it is a self cost. It it is not refundable. >> Uh even though it's a loan. >> Well, it's a loan because it's only repayable in the event there's an onward sale. So it's repayable in accordance with clause seven of the contract. But what about clause five? >> Well, so if I may, I'll I'll start at clause four. >> Okay. >> Because clause five, I say, is all about a decision being taken by KJF. It doesn't deal with what happens if an unsatisfactory report is provided. So you've got an unsatisfactory report which uh absolves uh absolves Contessa of paying the uh 2.39 million uh and Contessa is then entitled to walk away and it loses 1.6 million. >> Yes, it loses the money. >> So that's that's the commercial reality of this contract on your submission. Well, it is both the commercial reality and the the proper meaning and effect of a contract. >> Okay. Uh uh and so you've got a vessel which is unsatisfactory >> according to the discretionary powers exercised. >> Well, I mean well let's take an extreme example. Let let's say let's say it really was unsatisfactory. Let's say it was you know it was an appalling condition. Um so Contessa justifiably in the exercise of of its discretion says I'm not buying that. Um and you know no arguments about the reasonleness o of uh its decision or otherwise. Uh the reality of this is it still loses 1.6 million even though the the builder has produced a wholly unsatisfactory vessel. The reason why that is a conclusion is because we have an upstream relationship with between KJM and Sino Eagle. So we have as between as between KJM and Contessa they have an aligned interest their aligned interest is to is to sell the vessel onwards for a profit or I for more than 3.99 million. the the decision making power uh as to who purchases purchases the vessel sits with KJM alone. So it's the part and that's because it's a party who has to face the burden of of doing the work to sell the vessel and it won't get paid unless it was sell the vessel for more than 3.99 million and we we've learned from Mr. Rankovich and his evidence that the sales market can be fickle. He's talked about postcoid um softening of the market and the efforts they took to sell the sunseeker which uh which didn't work. >> So, so let's go back let's go back to our example. So, let's say let's say it's a re let's say it was reasonable to reject the survey report. Uh and so then uh Contessa you say loses his 1.6 million. Um so who gets to keep the 1.6 million? >> Well, this is not a tripartite contract. So as between Contessa and KJM, the 1.6 million sits with KJM. I I can't go beyond that because that's what happens in >> so so essentially contestant gets to keep the 1.6 million because no because there is an unsatisfactory vessel. Okay. That's that's a submission. >> Well, you're on a Sorry, you said contested there. It's >> Sorry, not contest. KJM gets to keep the 1.6 million uh because the vessel's unsatisfactory. >> Well, no. So, so I don't clearly I'm not saying that, am I? the part part of the the allocation of it's all about the allocation of risk in this contract. So the allocation of risk for the 1.6 million um sits with Contessa. It has paid the money over without any written terms and without any uh obligation on it to right to have that repaid. the except so so when it says the money is loaned that's not true >> it's it's not well it's I'm not saying it's not true but the the the character of this loan is in fact different the character of this loan is it's a joint commercial venture in miniature whereby Contessa puts up the capital and KGM puts up the sweat equity to sell the vessel so if if one thinks of it as closer in uh I in structure to an equity investment. >> It's called a loan. >> But it's called a loan. Uh but we can >> repayment provisions. >> Well, the repayment provisions are they are in many ways no different to the uh the repayment provisions. We then see ultimately in the joint venture because there had been a loan to the company. So one has your capital being paid back as the first bit of profit uh and then you have the the distribution of profits afterwards. >> Okay. >> So >> the bottom line is commercially I if if I if the vessel is genuinely unsatisfactory then you say that Contessa loses its 1.6 million. So I think >> even if that money has not been paid over to the boatyard. >> Well, >> you have to say I thought you said you conceded that a moment ago because it is not a tripartite contract. >> It's not a tripartite contract though it would be a different type of claim against me um if there if there really was an and sorry I should say perhaps Mr. Watson could refrain from engaging visually um during my submissions. I I believe I did. >> Well, that's all right. I I I'm looking at you, so I I didn't even see him. >> Okay. Um uh this is not a fraud claim against my client. Um this is not an allegation that we took the money and ran away with it. The uh the starting point is as in the preamble to the contract that uh that that this is all about the purchase of a vessel from a manufacturer. >> Yes. uh and uh I'm not able to help your your honor on the precise terms of the upstream relationship that we do have um I more than sufficient material to showing that there was an upstream relationship and that it's not a case of KGM pocketing the money because in fact we we have um indeed we have bank statements showing what happened to the money uh and all of that predates uh this contract so the the commercial reality of of who receives the 1.6 million as a sunk cost is it sino eagle um and and that will be and and it's the whole nature in effect of a deposit. It's a it's a deposit which is forfeited if ultimately the vessel is is the completion vessel does not happen. if that's what the contract between Sino Eagle and your client said. >> Well, >> which we don't know. >> But what what what we do have as part of the context of all of this is as at the date this was signed, part of the factual background is that we have the Volvo Penta report show and and everyone knows this is a new vessel sitting in the Silo Eagle yard. This is a vessel where a survey has already been commissioned and silo eagle is facilitating that survey. Uh and we know that 7 8 months earlier uh it was found to be in full mechanical working order. So that is the context of all of this that there clearly is a vessel being purchased that is clearly being held out by the manufacturer as being ready for delivery or certainly ready to be surveyed. Put it that way. It's not sitting in in in bits and pieces uh sprayed across a yard. It's not sitting at the bottom of a harbor. Um so so one does >> I think Mr. I think Mr. Ivankovich's suggestion that there never was a vessel that's not credible. >> Yes. And and indeed if that was a claim being made against me, this would be a different sort of claim. This would be a fraud claim. And it's not that. This is a this is a contractual claim linked to the proper meaning and effect of how does clause 2B operate and whether or not uh uh contessor has rights for repayment under clause five. So >> what I'm what I'm not persuaded about I is that uh any more than on a balance of probabilities a million was paid in relation to the vessel. The bank statements don't show a $600,000 payment. They show various payments as low as $97. Uh you've got a continuing relationship as a as a dealer with um the um with with the boatyard. Um those could be payments in respect of anything. I mean, I would be more persuaded if I saw a single payment of $600,000, which I don't. you you you do see something very close to that indeed. >> Very close is not the same. >> Well, um $587,000 is um uh is effectively $600,000 once one takes foreign documents to a payment schedule or receipts from the boatyard. That would be fine. But I'm but you know I'm I'm I'm in an area where I'm going to have to make inferences from the absence of documentation. >> Well, you're I'm certainly not here to to to argue with you. I'm I'm I'm here to to put forward my client's case to >> Of course you're here for your client's case and I'm giving you an opportunity to let you know where my mind is. >> Of course. And um I I I will come to some of the payments in due course. So if we focus just for the moment on on the contract, let me just >> um explain why I say that this result aligns with commercial common sense. So >> five quick points. First, this is a commercial venture with an intention to make a profit uh only following onward sale. >> Second, that the parties had aligned interests where they both stood to make a gain only if the vessel was sold for more than 3.99 million. Uh third, the contract allocates KJM as the party who has who is the decision-making party to decide whether or not to proceed with a purchase. Uh fourth uh that decision making power uh uh is to be taken with a knowledge that contestant could exercise a veto over any onward sale and we see that in clause 4 C that any onward sale must be approved in writing by contessor prior to finalization of the for sale. So KGM was leaving itself open to having a effectively an ongoing liability to carry on marketing and putting in its efforts to sell this vessel um until contestant was satisfied that its return would be high enough. And with those four facts in mind, there is no reason to believe that KGM would take the decision to proceed lightly. By contrast, there's every reason to think that uh uh Contessa had already committed to providing the money so long as KGM wished to proceed with the purchase and Contessa's fallback position was committing only onethird of the money if it wished to pull out after having seen the survey. Now, a a point raised in your honors uh uh comments in the course of Malone Friend submissions was whether or not you have to make a finding of facts about the contract for sale uh for the vessel itself. Um I recorded your honest to say I must make a finding of fact over whether there was a contract for sale and and indeed ma friend entirely properly um didn't uh support your honor in in that um suggestion. Uh the reason for that is that in fact it's not an issue between the parties as to whether or not there was a contract for sale uh of the vessel. uh the list of issues at page five of the uh of the UML document which starts at page four. Then we have the >> draft agreed list of issues and common ground. >> Yes. >> And those is not a draft. This is agreed. that this is agreed. Yes. So the word draft was wasn't deleted after the parties um had agreed it. Uh so the list of issues is then set out uh from page six onwards. Page six. Okay. Hey, where do you want to take me? >> Well, excuse me. So, so the list of issues there and over the page does not include an issue as to whether or not there was an upstream contract to the parties. Indeed, >> I have to make findings of fact. Well, you're material and I mean I can't be have I can be bound by what the parties agree to to be common ground. I suppose um >> if I put it this way most neutrally um nobody disagrees that the vessel that there was a contract to purchase a vessel. what we what we do not have and indeed no party I think puts um uh a a a positive case based on the evidence that that Mr. Watson and I have seen um is the price paid for the vessel by uh by KJM. >> Okay. So, what we do have in terms of just showing evidence that there was a contract for the vessel, I'll just take your honor through that quickly. Um, for your notes, if you note page 925, 1 1973, and 1282. We then just quickly walk through that and and that I hope does close off this point as to whether or not there was any proper relationship with Silo Eagle. So um 925 first of all. So this then is a communication from 13th of May 2023 uh between Aquilla boats and Sino Eagle. Uh we're this is you see the subject line Aquilla 70 order confirmation. Uh and everyone's excited looking forward to welcome you to the shipyard. >> Sorry 923. I was looking at 925. I'm so sorry. 923. >> So it's 925 is the is 925 and 926 is this particular exchange. So you see on 92 925 thank you for sending the signed documents and proof of payment transfer. So there exists there exist signed documents and proof of payment transfer which have not been disclosed. What am I to take from that? Well, you want to all all I can ask you to see from this contract from this email is that there was a contract for sale for the vessel that uh as between KGM and so Eagle. is not a mirage being being put together by >> No, I I accept you have to be very careful in making inferences. >> So, uh so that's what I take um from this. Uh and we have that over the page at 926 as well. We have a reference to the addendum. >> Now, I'm told that the addendum doesn't relate to this transaction at all. uh and your honor was taken to the uh the email from Pinson Mason to confirm that that that they looked at the addendum and and it was so the lawyers have seen it and Pinson Mason's concluded that it's not relevant. Um >> well, one of the one of the inferences from that because I I clearly accept um Pinson Mason's judgment is that the million dollars doesn't relate to this transaction. Well, >> we are pleased to enclose the signed addendum together with the transfer document of the sum of 1 million. So, if the 1 million is linked to the signed addendum and your solicitors, whose word I accept without hesitation says the signed addendum has nothing to do with this transaction, then the implication is the million dollars has nothing to do with this transaction either. I mean, you could both ways it seems to me. So or or read as a whole that sentence refers to the sum of $1 million advanced payment against the equil 70 as promised. So one has to >> well sorry where do I see that >> aquilla 70 order conf order confirmation at the top. >> Yes. Okay 926. So so the the the sentence itself links the million dollars to the aquilla 70. >> Yes. So we have that we have 973. >> It's very strange. >> Yes. Okay. 926. >> And I assume the addendum is an addendum to the master. So we we we finally in in in Mr. Hide by Wallace's evidence uh learned that there was a master agreement between um uh between KJM and Sino Eagle, which would make sense why an addendum was signed in relation to an individual sale. >> Logically speaking, yes. >> Yes. But that addendum has nothing to do with this transaction. Okay. So what what appears to be happening in this exchange is there are two things going on. We have talk of the addendum and talk of the Aquilla 70. We then get further discussion of the >> you know you just look at the wording we are pleased to enclose the signed addendum together with the trans. Well anyway it it says what it says. >> Yes. But it it's it's I find it extraordinary that the signed addendum has nothing to do with the Aquilla 17. >> Well, there we have it. We then move on to 1973 and the the relevant email is at 1974 over the page because this is an email between Aquilla Boats and KJM. Yes. >> So this now this is a year later and it's a clear statement by a miller itself. So we will consider the pay deposit as a total loss >> according to our purchase agreement. >> Yes. And then that email is forwarded on uh to uh or perhaps it's the um I don't know whether it's the email or the letter attached to that email that's forwarded on from Mr. Radwan to Mr. Moore and that's from 1973. So I again I take from this the the straightforward conclusion that there that there was a contract to purchase a vessel uh from Sino Eagle that Sino Eagle is putting forward a statement that unless you pay the balance you will lose your deposit. >> So it's not about KJM receiving a windfall. It's uh well Aquilla um forfeiting the deposit >> but the uh but but Sino Sino uh Eagle have not anywhere have they acknowledged or we don't have receipt for the amount paid to them. >> Well they they we have um acknowledgement of the $1 million. >> Where's that? >> So that Well, that was just where we saw that at 925. >> 925. >> Yes. Uh yes. Oh quite. Okay. We have an acknowledgement of a payment of of $1 million. Yes. And it's headed a quill of 70. Yes. Okay. >> Yes. >> Okay. Yes. You're absolutely right. >> So happy I can answer some questions to your to your honors satisfaction. >> Uh then the the the final exchange on this is 1282 to 1284. And this is effectively a continue. So in fact, we start at 1284. That is one of the emails we've just seen at 1973. But we then get different emails further up the chain. 1283. reply there from Mr. Al Jasmine >> 1282 reference again to uh within the terms and conditions of our sale agreement. Yes. Then 1283. >> Well, and then you I if I may, it's that next paragraph which says therefore the entire deposit received from the dealership is lost. >> Yeah. and the boats will be sold via the network. So we then now have a statement uh that says the 9th of August on 1282 that uh Sino Eagle has forfeited the money. >> Yes. >> So coming back to my construction argument, this is not about KJM uh uh receiving a windfall of the 1.6 6 million having uh handed over a survey of any an unsatisfactory survey. >> But they could they could have a windfall of6 million. >> So I'm not able to help your honor on on on what else it is. I I am able to show you that in and what I do ask your honor to to infer is that the subsequent payments um amounted about 800,000 are linked to this vessel. I've heard what your honor has said already about that. Um I don't have any more material to show you beyond the bank statement themselves. >> Um but but I ask you to make that the inference in my client's favor. >> Yes, I understand. Um, and this is all linked to the um to the proper construction of clause 2B. And of course, everyone accepts >> that uh that that the parties may have different views about whether or not the uh the survey is satisfactory. whether or not one is talking about it as a survey as a process or survey in terms of satisfactory the conclusion of the condition of the vessel. Um and it's because the contract allows a difference of opinion that the contract also provides for contessor to forfeit uh it its 1.6 6 million if it exercises discretion. Uh and and it is I say important for the court to bear in mind in it in its analysis of the contract and uh and the claim itself that it is not said we committed any breach of contract linked to clause 2B at all. It's simply >> but I mean you're saying it's a matter of construction. Bottom line of all of this as you say is even if Contessa exercises uh its right to reject the vessel on entirely proper grounds, it forfeits its 1.6 million. So and and it's precise that that that if contestant decides that that that the that within its discretionary powers uh this is not a satisfy and it loses 1.6. >> Yes. I mean even if it's quite rational in doing so. >> Yes. Because that and that is a consequence of of the bargain it has entered into. >> Okay. So it's an ill-advised bargain. But you say that uh you remind me of the English authorities. is not for the court to rewrite bad bargains etc etc >> and yeah I don't say it's an ill-advised bargain I say it's just simply the bargain that the parties picked and it's all linked to uh well I'll perhaps come on to the survey itself shortly but let's deal with the banana duty briefly I don't think you um your needs much help with me about from me about whether or not a banana duty >> no I I think I I've heard everything I've heard everything that Mr. Watson has said certain I'm persuaded that there isn't there isn't a duty. >> Thank you. Um well I I'm um I don't think in expecting an exemplary judgement the end of today but I shall take that uh and um move on. I think let me just check my notes. There's anything else I want to say along the way. Yes. Um just a little point to make then in terms of the the uh clause 2B itself. Um this is all about an evaluative exercise being made by uh by Contessa uh and uh that is directed to an identifiable object um namely the adequacy of the survey and is able to take a step that uh that would prejudice KJM uh because if it withholds the money then KGM doesn't get paid that become even more so if it it I if it has a right to do so uh to withhold the money and then KGM comes under a positive obligation to repay it. So your honor has we've talked about the extreme example one way of this being a a scuttled vessel uh that uh that is then um a survey is put forward the survey and that's it. But the other way round is that we have heard in the evidence that vessels uh it would be worrying for a survey not to contain a snag list um after a 5-day um process. And this clause talks about a survey. It doesn't talk about a survey plus follow-up surveys. This is all about a fiveday window following presentation of a document and then and then a decision being taken. Um, and if contestant takes his decision not to pay over the money uh due to a toilet not being sufficiently washed, let's put it down to that extreme. Um, that would be frankly unfair on my client to be to be faced in with a burden of repaying the $1.6 million um for for the want of a of a lube brush. Um so uh I say that the the banana duty then flags up why it is that we have the the contract working as it does. So if then if one takes the um the clause out of its face and and and assumes uh that there is a progressive duty involved. Um the next question is whether or not um contest's determination report was not satisfactory was rational and clearly I don't get there if Mr. Watson succeeds in the end on uh on his primary case that but that rationality doesn't come into it. Um so my primary argument in terms of rationality is that we are looking at the report uh as a document um not the conclusions relating to the vessel. >> The the threshold the threshold question of fact in relation to rationality is when the report was handed over because your expert agrees that if it was handed over a year afterwards then that's not satisfactory. So you firstly have to establish when it was handed over. If it was handed over roughly contemporaneously with when it was made, then we look at the rationality of it. >> Yes. And I come to it perhaps the other way around, but but we end up at the same uh location that that that everyone is happy with this report both um as a report and its views about the vessel that there is some argument at the margin about who should do the air conditioning um works before it comes through and whether that requires further investigation. Um what one at that point is is is in paradatic. So let's deal first of all with the process points. Everyone is content that this is a a proper survey. We can then move on to the conclusions question. Um that there is a um an to an extent a live debate between the parties about whether or not uh this report says amounts to the vessel being ready for delivery the next day or whether or whether some works would be required. um none of that quite locks in to what the contract says is about whether or not this is a satisfactory survey. So it would be entirely open uh for for contestants to say this is a satisfactory survey. we would like everything else to be sorted and then it's down to KJM um as part of its decision- making powers um to then go off to Silo Eagle and say right we've now got the money but we tell you what you've got really got to sort out these soil the these snagging issues and again everyone has agreed but part of the process of completing a sale is uh is is this snag resolution process and and we have both key witnesses is talking about this in their evidence. So Mr. Avankovich talks about um the analogy of riding a horse before you buy it. Um uh Mr. Al Jasmi has talked about he gave an example of of a vessel in the Maldes being delivered and again people flying around the world as part of all that process. So clearly the purchaser of a vessel never simply gets a survey and then says right on the base of this piece of paper I'm happy with it. But instead what happens in this contract is that all of those peripheral aspects uh uh and indeed perhaps very important third party aspects of who goes and has a look at the vessel and a bit of a test ride on it. All of that falls to KGM as part of its decision-making power whether or not to proceed with a purchase. Um, contesttors uh contractual rights are limited to the survey itself. Um, and the survey itself is only ever going to provide a report on the condition of the vessel. uh no surveyor in the property world or I imagine any other world is going to take it um rationally would take it upon him or herself to start giving a um a professional recommendation whether or not to buy the assets in question. That's not the purpose of uh of a survey. Uh and uh and uh that commercial decision I say was all for KGM to take. Um so on the question of whether or not the duty was breached we have dealing the survey itself we then have the um uh the threshold point about uh when was it handed over and you want to hear has a um uh clear blue sky of about one year period between the two parties on this. We say July 2023. Um Mr. Watson's client says 11th of July 2024. Um the chronology um favors me. But before jumping into the detail um of it um we can make a few quick headline points. We know that everybody was involved in commissioning the survey and that took place in May and June 2023. We know that after the survey was carried out that there were a series of in-person meetings in in Dubai in July and August 2024. We know that by September onwards 2023 the parties are talking about an onward sale of the vessel. And in the course of those discussions, Mr. Vankovich makes a series of promises about making payments. And at no point does he mention the lack of a survey. And finally, in terms of headline points, there are no reasons for KJM to be coy about the report. It commissioned the report openly and had every reason to provide the port the report to Mr. Because indeed the provision of the report was the key to unlocking the balancing payment. So, uh there are then a number of different dates to walk through. I'm I'm content to do it as far as solely as your honor would like, but you'd assume all of these documents previously in the course of evidence. >> Yes. I mean, I have to say that your last point there is is is probably your best in many ways because why why wouldn't your clients disclose the report? There seems to be no rational reason not to. >> Yes. And it's in everyone's interest that certainly we know by the end of this chronology that silo eagle is pressing for payment. Uh and uh if there was any issue about have documents been provided or not that would have been discussed and and they would have KGM would have sent it onwards. That has changed slightly come April 2024 by which point the party's relationship is breaking down. But even then we have an open offer by KGM um for for offices visits to happen to their offices and we're told that's not an ownorous request because that's happening all the time by all sorts of different people from the Ivankovich um world put it that way. So you perhaps if I just um read out a few key dates and yeah uh and page references and then you can slow me down when you consider appropriate. Uh so we we have the May dialogue uh and if they have common ground that there's a a zoom call that happened in May not June um then we pick up the story 13th of June and in the May dialogue it was Mr. hand who is going to be fisting u the yard and that's not a contractual right um that contestant has but indeed that's a pre-contractual discussion as part of what they were talking about that time >> you give me some you give me the page references too it just helps my note if you've got them >> yes let me do that uh that'll be in the So if we uh start at the reference to Mr. Uh page is uh 899 and 900 to see letter of invitation. Uh then we have the uh the quotation from Admiral Marine at page 910. That's the 9th of June. And what I'll do from now on, I'll give you date and then page reference. Next date, 13th of June, 23, page 918. This is an email from KJM to Mr. Hand. And here everyone talking about time is of the essence uh and the importance of getting everything sorted quickly. Uh and Mr. and the top of the page um approving uh the appointment of a surveyor and saying time is of the essence. The boat needs to get to Dubai as soon as possible. And then the email change from the 13th of June to the 22nd of June is at pages 922 to 923. uh and that there is the uh confirmation by KGM that the surveyor has been appointed and is going to be visiting uh after 3rd July or from third July onwards. Then uh we have Mr. out Jasmy's evidence at uh page 96, paragraph 45 of his witness statement where he gives the dates of the meetings in July 2023 and these have all been accepted by Mr. Vangovich is accurate. And my case is that the document was handed over at one of these meetings. We then know from uh both parties that there are regular meetings at the site. We don't have all the dates of those meetings, but we do get some snippets in the documents. There was a meeting on the 23rd of August, 2023, page 1095. And already at this time the talk about the onward sale. No reference to the survey. Uh this note has been prepared of course by Mr. Hand and and if there had been a question mark about where is a survey you told us two months ago this all been commissioned. What's happened? One would expect to see it here. But we don't have that. Um, a month later we have another exchange page as a date is 29th of September 2023 page 116. So on 29th of September talking about um structuring or the the on the lease of the vessel and then on the 5th of October page 118 Mr. Vankovich is having already sent a spreadsheet he's going to talk about the bet we are making. That's the bet he's making with the vessel. Page 1121 is an exchange in uh later October that this is an email as per your request and at this point I I'd ask you to prefer Mr. Perushi's evidence to that of Mr. Anankovich that The reason that email starts with as per your request is that Mr. Rangovich had asked um for to be reminded of payments of the balance amount. They're talking about making a balancing payment. Nobody's concerned about the survey at all. And then over to page 1122. And this now is a reference in the contemporaneous document to marketing efforts. And uh Mr. Rankovich is agreeing with that. There are no points he saying here in this exchange. Uh, hang on. The cart is getting before the uh the horse. What about the survey and that discussion carries through we have a number of pages here uh 1126 where screenshots of calculations that's all linked in the vessel And it's Mr. Vanovich here at 1127 putting forward figures uh for what the what the sale price is that would be acceptable to Kim then 1144 uh it's the 14th of November 2023 three and we have a Yes, we start 1144 and I I say here that Mr. which evidence his evidence should not be accepted that he's they're being cheeky or sarcastic as he puts it in his witness statement. Um he's making a promise to send them a wire and uh frankly whatever he thinks he's saying his own subjective understanding of those words Mr. Hybrid Waller understands the language to be um um to mean what it says and hence his reply we need the 70 in this region. Um then over the page 1145 um this is Mr. the high waller um pleading for the balancing payment to the equilla 70 and there is a slight discontinuity here because 1146 is not actually the next page in a chronology. Um that is a response which happens on the I think the 4th of December which to be better carried on at 1161 So we then flip into Mr. uh Ivankovich's uh WhatsApp and we see there the top of that page 11 161 that in fact as far as a balance of payments for empty quill that message sent a few days later on the 4th of December but that is the time and he engages substantively with the message from the 30th of November and the fact that the payload is already set up it's just that Mr. Ankovich is satisfied that uh with the condition of the vessel. Um we then start to uh discover uh through March next year why all these promises have been empty promises. Uh this is in the email of the 7th of March 2024 at page 121. This is the first time that Mr. complains about liquidity issues and the response is significant as well for Mr. Jasmine page 120. And if I can ask you just briefly now to read uh number Let me see if this is the bottom of the page. I ask the EP uh technician to scroll up. There we are. after the word aquilla at number three. and so your honor the importance of this communication is um to my knowledge this is the first time that we have a contemporaneous communication to Mr. Manovich saying unless you pay the balance the manufacturer is going to take the deposit and if Mr. Frank had not seen the survey at that point. There would have been an electric response. But no point saying how dare you or how dare Sono Eagle. Um what we have then is an exchange at at the start of April. Uh the page 126. This is a page you may just about recall. It's very hard to read on a black background, but the uh it's the first, excuse me, it's the uh third bullet point in effect what Mr. Chasm is saying here is that your delay are causing us real problems with our relationship. with some C gas. And then moving on 1250. We have Mr. Jasmi now. Give me a precise date. towards the bottom of that page, 28th of April, 2024, with no responsibility on us if the factory revoked the transaction and took the deposit. >> 21st of April. >> 21st of April. Yes. Now the reply is at the top of that page but there's only half of it. So the full version appears 1252. If we just scroll down slightly because he was over in fact on 1253 he Mr. discusses the aquilla vessel he's referring back there to uh document requests from KCM OI about the Aquilla purchase and then Mr. Revankovich is saying all of this is actually a loss for the JV. You see at the bottom of that paragraph paragraph, a loss of deposit will be a loss for the JV as specified under the JV documents. So there's no contemplation there that anyone's going to get a refund if I if the vessel isn't delivered. It's just simply a question of where the loss is subtle. Then rolling all the way forwards, it's the 26th of June 2024. Uh on page 1973 that we then have we've looked at this already, Mr. about passing on the communication about the final payment deadline of the third of August and then from that point onwards through July 2024 and start of August 2024 the lawyers move into the foreground and the principles are in the background. Um just a few key emails. Uh page 1983, Mr. Radan there saying um talking about the discretion Mr. Vankovich has through confessor uh does he want to press forward or not? And that discussion matures by the 30th of July 2024. Page 1296. And your honorable remember there are some emails along the way here and indeed the email including the the the admitted fact that we have a digital receipt of the survey and some discussion about the survey. Um uh but then on the 30th of July 2024, we then have uh a request for the the wire instructions and a request then for the the named purchaser now to be Mr. Avankovich. So it's a different sort of contract that's being uh a different sort of structure. It's now being vaged and but this scrapping around is all far too late. 2nd of August 2024. Um, indeed I should say just on this document, Mr. Angish now distanced himself from that email. Um, but I'm afraid the law of agency doesn't work like that. But his lawyers wrote it and and he stuck to the consequence of it. Uh, 2nd of August 2024, page 1322. Uh and uh just actually towards the top of that page in MT1 1321 uh it's here Mr. Moore confirming that Mr. Rank does want to proceed. He wants to proceed on a different basis. He wants some of his own people to visit the yard. That's all well and good, but that's not what the contract says. I'm afraid it's all too little too late and we've seen the correspondence from Sino Eagle already giving clear notice they would forfeit the deposit by then. So in terms of the witnesses um on this point um both the key witnesses have been uh uh were were did not move in their evidence on the point. Mr. Vankovich um uh denied receiving document in July 2023. Um Mr. Al Jasmine was clear that he did give the document in July 2023. Um with respect Mr. Anankovic's credibility is somewhat undermined by now seeing ghosts behind every corner. Uh he now goes so far as to suggest that the Admiral report was created artificially in July 2024. None of these are pleaded points. Um and indeed it contradicts what his own expert is saying and it just shows as ever in cases of this nature that parties emotions have rather clouded their their proper recollection of events. Mr. Jasmine evidence uh was uh uh was clear and fixed on this point that he provided document in July 2023. Uh it's the key statement by him from him is day three page 55 line one to turn it up. Uh but that's the transcript reference where he says the actual handover was in July only. Uh and then your honor asked uh did you personally give the report to Mr. Vanovich uh to a chances. Yes, I did. I delivered it to him in person. That's day three uh page 17 through to 18 and again page 35. And again he said that he showed the report of Mr. Ric again in February 2024 and that will be consistent with a hard copy being at the KGM officers. I don't see to overstate Mr. Al Jasmine's evidence. He was speaking through an interpreter. um and some imperfections may well have emerged in his reflections, but he was clear and steadfast on this point and I ask that his evidence is accepted on this point. So you want to if you're not with me on actual receipt and the waiver and stople arguments arise, I I'll perhaps I'll deal with those quickly and then we might might take our midm morning break at that point. Excuse me. Um well now lunchtime break for for those of us in London but good afternoon break for uh or or or any short break for those elsewhere in the world. >> Um why you stop? Uh so uh we've already looked at the exchanges and the messages um from uh between Mr. Hardrad Waller and uh Mr. Ivankovic. Um the key messages I rely on are the 14th of November uh where Mr. Ivankovich says we will we will have to send them a wire shall have it shipped to the US as well. the 4th of December as far as balance of the payments uh go it's already set up and for the 7th of March email is explaining the delay um doctor waiting on liquidation of certain securities. So individually and cumulatively Mr. Rangovich was treating the balance as due and the survey issue as closed. Uh he never says uh once during that period that he'll only consider paying the money once he's had a satisfactory survey. He simply saying that he will pay and the the thing which stands in the way of payment is money not survey. Um Melon friend relies uh in his skeleton on the no oral modification clause at uh clause 15. Uh that with respect doesn't help him in this case. Uh in my opening I I already took you to paragraph 16 of that judgment which I believe we have at uh just your page reference. It's 728 of the supplementary bundle. towards the bottom of that page. Um no assumption in that case um couldn't be clearer that that no oral modification clauses um can be uh uh circumvented by the doctrines of the stoppple and that operates as a proper safeguard. The test is over the page 729. There needs to be some words of conduct unequivocally representing that variation is valid notwithstanding its informality. So one isn't looking for a formal statement of I hereby wave uh my right to look at the survey. Instead one looks um at communications in their context. We have here WhatsApps uh and the WhatsApps by Mr. saying um words of effective I will make payment and then on reliance point at that early date uh in theology reliance is I say straightforward because it's the um payments which were made onwards to uh silo eagle after that And these are listed uh both in my skeleton and learn friend skeletons in terms of the payments made. We'll just uh look at them briefly. 1632. This is a trial bundle 1632. And I start here rather than the earlier payment because uh well, if we scroll up slightly. So clearly I can't rely on waiver for payments made before there was a promise to make payment. Um, so one one gets that from October onwards. Uh, and it's uh we have their big payments of $27,000. Uh, your honor asked earlier about the $600,000. That payment is made the 13th of March 2024, page 1637. and it's 588527. So that that is as um a post one get to $600,000, but there's a a further payment um a week or two later is 28,000. Excuse me. Yes, is a week later it's $28,900. And all of these have the reference aquilla. So I ask your honor to make a finding that those payments are linked to the uh contessa uh uh loan agreement and that payments made by my client to uh keep the transaction alive. And that all locks in with the communications by Mr. Jasmi about uh Sono Eagle threatening before closers. Um so that's uh deals I hope with uh a waiver. Um in terms of the later payments this is the latest communications in July um uh to send that I don't think Mr. Watson um seriously hopes to hold my feet to the fire too much with the the pleading because he said in opening that he was content to deal with it on the facts and indeed witnesses were um cross-examined uh on uh on some of the earlier points. It's a fair enough point for him to make in closing but I say in substance it doesn't help him. the court has the benefit of full argument uh and the full factual matrix on uh on the early transactions uh in terms of looking at the uh late July communications themselves um there to be seen in the context of the earlier communications and in the light of those promises by Mr. rankage personally to uh uh to make payments. That's uh what was really being said there. The reliance uh is linked back to what then happened with the yacht itself. So because we have a promise to make payment uh KJM then itself doesn't take steps and this money is lost. If there had been quite a different communication in July that Mr. is out now we've seen the report not satisfactory not prepared go for it then KGM would have had a month um to uh uh to take whatever steps it need to take to take delivery of the vessel but it was denied that opportunity um through the the words and conduct of Mr. through his lawyers. Uh I mean you're on his hands. I I could go on for another five minutes and finish off Contessa and then we'll have a break or um we >> let's go on. Let's let's Why don't you finish Contessa? It sounds cleaner. Um so I if contrary to the above contessa um was not obliged to advance the balancing payment um claimants must still the must still establish a contractual right for the return of the 1.6 million. um clause five of the contract is their only route um for that and as I've said already um that clause is engaged only where um the purchase doesn't proceed as a result of KJM this decision making um powers um contessor cannot invoke the non-occurrence of the purchase when that flows from its own failure to fund the balance that prevented the purchasing vessel and in my skeleton I rely on the prevention principle party may not rely on the non-fululfillment of a condition which its own act has prevented and here the deposit was lost to the to the yard and we've seen that the yard did treat it as a total loss and that was because contesta have held a balance. So again, it all in a sense, one gets there either through the original construction of clause 2B or the interaction of clause 2B with clause five that we don't have an allegation of breach of contract up to this point in time against my client at all. is not said as part of learn PD cases that we've done anything wrong through to uh uh um actually through to September 2024 because that's when they make the demand for repayment for the first time and they said that that demand for repayment we didn't comply with it and that was the breach of contract. So on a proper analysis, clause five uh um isn't engaged because of the prevention principle. Second on this point, clause six uh requires written notice and uh I don't think I need to trouble you on that. Um just finally on interest, Murder Friend's draft order uh and his skeleton asks for interest starting 26th of May 2023. That's a date of payment. Now clearly that can't be right because uh it's not said we breached contract from 26th of May 2023. So the earliest possible date that interest might arise would be sometime after the demand for payment or repayment is made. Um so we're talking in September October 2024 and the interest claim itself clashes with the express uh words in the contract. This is an interestfree loan. This is not a case where contestant has an option to have his money paid back with interest. Alternatively, it gets a stake in the in in the vessel. It only gets a commercial return in the event the vessel is purchased and uh uh and the um uh and it's sold for a profit. Uh in terms of counter claim, um that I can deal with. I hope in a couple of sentences. I need to win uh on uh the question of was there a satisfactory report in the media clause 2B. Um second, I cannot win uh that argument through the estoppel route for the purpose of my counter claim because I'll be using it as a sword, not a shield. So in fact, I must win and the court must be satisfied. right on July 2023 being the delivery date. Um I also need to win on the banana argument as well. So there was a breach here. If it's an absolute discretion, then um confessor was within his rights to withhold uh the uh the uh the money for whatever reason. So it's not uh it's not automatic that if uh one client one party loses the other one wins that there there are slightly different routes that I have to win by uh in order to actually succeed on my counter claim and if if I do win through that route the next question is quantum uh I've set out in my skeleton in some detail and Mr. Jasmine gives a figure of $400,000. Um uh we've got a pleading case of both loss of profit or wasted costs. The figures are in my skeleton. I think more than a friend accepts them. Wasted costs um 200 odd thousand. It's I think 1.83 million I think is the the token figure paid over. So if you want to satisfy that that the bank statement up in the screen in front of you do relate to uh the Aquilla vessel uh then uh then at the minimum our wasted costs would be 283,000. The alternate route would be loss of profits uh based on the limited discussions that were had by the parties concerning the onward sale of the vessel. Um so that's my case on the contessor. I can then go on I hope deal with very b uh relatively briefly on the joint venture. >> Okay. So we'll take a break now. Uh we'll come back at 52 the hour please. Thank you. >> Okay. Shall we proceed? Yes. Um moving on then to the JVA claim. uh we have uh three grounds to uh look at um for termination. The first is insolvency. I'd like to start if I may with uh the JV agreement itself. Um the contract starts at page 881. Clause K A3 is at page 886. uh and uh within that clause you can see uh there are three different types of insolvency which uh are relevant here. The first uh is if any venturer makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors or petitions for appointment of a trustee or receiver of the venturer or of any substantial portion of the assets of that venturer. Uh then this ne next option is if any venturer commences any proceeding pursuance to any bankruptcy dot dot dot or three if any venturer is adjudicated bankrupt or insolvent dot dot dot I rely on uh options A and B. So is a venturer making an assignment uh for a substantial portion of the assets of that venturer. Alternatively, proceed um commencing proceedings and we see that through the uh uh the Vancouver family chapter 11 uh debt uh page 1357 I think is a reference. No, that's not that wasn't right. Uh books into lost that reference that we found Excuse me. 1675 or there about 1657. I might perhaps start on. So we we we saw here in evidence that uh one of the people who um petitioned for the chapter 11 bankruptcy is Mr. Bangovich himself. Let me try to think of that precise page reference within the judgment. Excuse me. Yes. The judgment starts at page 1647 and there's reference there to the Mr. Vanovich's confirmation efflu told us in evidence day two page 162 through 163 is that I don't have any personal wealth but in reality all his wealth is tied up in the various different family entities. Where do I see Mr. Ibankovich as a personal petitioner? >> So we see that it's it's not as a personal petitioner as a and I hope I didn't overstate my case there. Uh it's that he issues a confirmation affidavit. >> What is the function of a what is the function of a confirmation affidavit? >> So we see I'll pick up the story. It says over the page. So page 1648 you see the word voting certificate underlined. >> Yeah. >> Just after those two words underline it then gives the >> confirmation affidavit of Steven de Bank of this. Yeah. >> Yes. Uh and then over the next page. So the purpose of that confirmation affidavit is filed in support of confirmation of the plan. >> But a creditor can confirmation of the plan, can't they? But Mr. accepts that he is uh and this is all for for linked to his divorce proceedings and we saw that through 16 I think 1657. >> Yes. But does that make him does that actually make him a petitioner? >> It doesn't. Does it? >> I don't understand enough about US bankruptcy practice really to be able to say. I mean, you may you may know more than me. >> So, you all I'm able to is point you through to the fact that this is an application uh effectively made by the debtors. The plan proponents are explained. Well, it's made the data the data the dattors are various companies. >> Uh and then >> but they're all that Mr. Ivankovic has filed some form of affidavit the function of which I don't know. So what what we all we really discover from this document so so far as relevant to my case on termination is that uh there are a series of debtors um which are which include the the the two ANO family uh companies and that's significant because they make a lot of the payments um for the joint venture and they are described at the top of page 1648 as plan proponents Yes. >> And it's Mr. Avankovich personally who is uh one of the people signing off on this document. Uh and there's no question that he does that he's the manager of these companies. >> Yes. >> And that he's closely involved in it because we we also know throughout his evidence he talked about he being the person who arranges for payments. He doesn't seek to um stand on ceremony in how he describes himself in the mechanics of the payments in his witness statements. >> Yes. >> Um uh so we know that in reality that as he says he has no money to his name. All his money is structured through these complex arrangements. Uh those complex arrangements uh corporate interests were themselves restructured um linked to his personal divorce. >> Yeah. So I assumed that the the restructuring was to uh shield his assets from um his alimony payments. Uh and no he was unsuccessful in that because uh his current soon to be former wife uh was made an exception to the scheme quite yes. So I I I didn't need to quite go that far with with my examination of Mr. Vanovich and thought better of it. Um but but it it strikes me that that's a um a fair inference to draw that >> from the foot we've got that from the footnote, haven't we? >> Precisely. Yes. Yeah. So certainly Bob put it this way that if that was the intention of the chapter 11 process, then it didn't work because the but certainly um uh the judge in Florida spotted this as a risk and and protected uh Janet Vancul's interests. Um but nonetheless the effect of that and the effect uh of the personal um uh uh or is against him are sufficient I say to trigger uh the uh clauses K uh uh K3 in the contract and all of this is to be understood in the context of a warranty right in the front of the JV agreement um clause a little B that Mr. Rangovich declares that he has the financial resources to provide the required capital for the funding of the fabrication design and manufacturing premium the page >> excuse me yes of course page 881 >> 881 >> thank you >> so at 881 there's reference there to Mr. having the financial resources. Now, everyone knows in reality it's not about him having the financial assets in his own legal name. >> It's having access to them. >> It's having access to them. And that is what is affected by the chapter 11 process. And the wording of clause KA3 does not require the venturer himself or itself to be adjudicated bankrupt. It's good enough if it links into any substantial portion of the assets of the venturer. So that must then mean a company connected to the venture in some way and al and little B is if a venturer commences any proceeding pursuant to any bankruptcy and we know that Mr. Envankovich was one of the um petitioners of the chapter 11 process. >> I'm sorry I have to intervene there because that is simply factually false. Yeah, I thought we've been I thought we've been over that that he wasn't a petitioner. >> Yeah. And it says that the petitioners are the companies. So I think Malan has to be careful how he puts his case. It says >> he is a he is a manager of the companies that petition for chapter 11 bankruptcy. That is the accurate. >> Yes, I would accept that. Your apologies if I'm being insufficiently precise. I I'm as I hope I've I've made it entirely clear that I'm not at any point saying that Mr. himself was petitioning for his own bankruptcy. >> No, that would not be a manager. >> He is a manager of the petitioners. >> Yes. >> Whether that's enough for the purpose of the clause, I'll have to decide. >> Uh so that then is uh ground one. uh uh so the proceedings um uh so all of the joint venture money was uh well sent to either Gleno or ANO is one of the uh chapter 11 companies uh and I say that that therefore is met that we have insolveny uh in one of the meanings under KA3 ground two is non-payment. Now this breaks down into two elements. Uh first of all non-payment of the arrow vessels. Now I don't seek to pursue that point uh because the personal attribution of the arrow vessels is a matter that's been resolved by the onshore by courts. The second aspect of that is late payments under the joint venture agreement and its amendments. And uh it's expressly admitted that the notice covers this and that's at uh reply paragraph 36 page 563. All right. in relation to JVA sums due under the second amendment to the JVA 36.1 said clause required by necessary implication written notice of exercise the termination did give notice did did give written notice under KA1 >> that sorry uh paragraph >> 36.1 French case and the point taken against me is substantive rather than procedural Okay. So, notice is missing. >> Mhm. So in in terms of the joint venture uh uh amendment amendment number two uh that is in uh page 913 and we have uh the first payment was uh made later any view comes after 19th of June and then the second tranch is full to um after the relevant buildup. Then we have the third branch. Now the notice question that you ask a friend about of what uh what notices were given for the capital calls. >> Yes. Uh I rely on uh a notice of 24th of November 2023 page 1131. Oh no that's uh come out right. Uh, >> it's an email 24th of November, 2023. Let me just find that. >> Yes. I'm very sorry. Unless there's a lot coming up. Um, that's the old school way of looking at the index. There we go. Page 1137. It's my own bad handwriting. So we have there uh express references to the addendum the capital call table talking about a million dollars received and the shortfall from that uh statement that the third capital call is due asks very precise amount and a proper construction of that email. It's asking for the amount to be paid well in advance of the 1st of January 2024. The next document relied upon is in 9th of August 2024. That's a page 1349. This comes at a time when the process is more heavily uh lawyered. And here there's a request for payment of uh this is an additional contribution by the 16th of August 2024. That's only second bullet point. So Mr.'s 's answer about why he didn't make payments due to the original in the original time frames uh being linked to the absence of a bank account for KJI. That I'm afraid doesn't ring true. That is KJI has never had a bank account. So all of the payments which have been made have been to KJM and indeed when the contracts were signed there was no condition present there that KGI would have a bank account or the payments would be made to KJI on a proper construction of the contracts. It was simply requirement for payments by the dates given for the joint venture bank camp and that for these purposes bank camp held by KJN. Just have a look at the financial statement. >> The bank statement references are 111. >> No, the financial statement. >> Oh yes, I referred that. I'm afraid we don't have that in the bundle. >> So what we get then is >> I thought we had the I thought we had the auditor's report the financial >> but that comes uh later. So that's not this particular one being referenced there. >> I'm sorry I'm not following. I just wanted to have a look at the auditor's report. >> The auditor report. Yes, of course. I can show that to you. Uh so but this so this email is sent in August 2024. The auditor's report deals with a period finishing 31st of December 2024 which is why it uh it doesn't >> it's page 1702. I think you're >> 702. 1702 is where the audit report is but then produced uh about nine months later. >> Yes. I just wanted to have a quick look over a year later. >> Yes. Bear with me a second. >> Yes. Why does it say cash and bank balances? John, I'm I'm not able to help you further beyond what it says in the audit report itself. Yes, I just wanted to test the suggestion that it never had a bank account. Well, either the audit report is defective in yet another particular or it did have a bank account. >> I believe we have evidence from the parties of the absence of a bank account. I think if you want to look at page 1715 of the audit report >> 1715 >> it's it's broken down by the auditor as between cash in hand cash at bank cash at the bank two sorry this is dams isn't it so uh yeah so 261,000 dirham Um but if the auditor were halfway competent, he would have seen uh a bank account. Is there a note? There's no note to suggest that KJM was providing banking facilities. KJI is there. Okay. So anyway, this this is unexplained. Yes. Um uh well certainly I'm not hoping to pay it more than it is in the evidence and the payments by the uh by the ANO family trust to KJM. >> Yes. It's just bizarre anyway. Okay. So uh we say that there should have been um payment in time that there was not payments and that then was why there was uh a default ground three is material change under JB3 again this is expressly admitted as a ground covered by the notice that's paragraph 35 of the friends defense excuse me is uh reply by page 563 and it's 35.1 and the material change uh uh in the venture management business assets or company structure we say well that's all covered by the chapter 11 process And also that's where the divorce proceedings come squarely uh into focus as well. So you want to on the liability point that that's all I have to say about uh uh those um on the question of relief. uh we do have a um a very substantial uh departure uh from the pleaded case in the draft order and I don't propose to be overly forensic about it but what I would invite your honor to do uh uh after the hearing is to compare the ple the declaration sort of ple of case uh with the draft order for the moment I think it's best just to focus my attention on the draft order itself Mhm. >> And to compare that with the terms of the joint venture agreement. >> Yes. >> Because clearly any right the maximal rights that uh Mr. might have are only those stated in the joint venture agreement. So uh the draft order is started at page 41 of friend skeleton. Is there a reference to this in the supplemental >> 1075? >> Thank you. So paragraph two deals with the declaratory relief point and I accept if I've lost on liability. Well clearly that will be that declaration will made against me. The problems come from paragraph three onwards. So we have here a a proposal for uh specific performance or a positive injunction for the appointment of Baker Tilly UAE as the third defendant's auditor. We have no information at this stage about how its fees will be paid for. There's no promise to underwrite those fees by Mr. Ankovich personally. Um there is no even no quotation of those fees what it would now charge for those services um nor is there any statement that is willing to be appointed. So there are problems immediately with this proposal uh and they and the direction for convening the general assembly and voting for the appointment of Batilly. All of this I say is is um overcooked. What uh what the cont what the joint venture agreement does provide for uh is at page 885. >> No, we're in the wrong bundle. So this now should be the trial bundle. >> I'm back in the trial bundle. >> Oh, there. Sorry. It's the EP operator who >> Oh, yeah. I don't I don't use that. Yes, I'm sorry. >> Okay. Um, so uh clause HC. >> Yes. >> Um, calls for a bian HC. Little C >> HC. Yes. Thank you. >> Calls for a bianual audit in July and January or June, December. So if a learner friend wants relief, declarative relief that the JVA entitles his client to a biomial audit um and then identifying the month the dates as either July and June or January December. Fine. Um but specific performance requiring specific votes takes us into a type of shareholder dispute which is simply not here. The appropriate route forward if the court is is against me on liability will be to make a declaration that tracks through the appropriate words of the joint venture and we then list the matter back for a consequentials hearing between the parties. If once these rights have been established and declared by the court, if if they are to be declared, um if the parties can't then agree how to put that into effect and then at that point the matter would come back to the court. Well, I I just wonder if I would have jurisdiction above and beyond what is in the JVA >> and with respect to what I I um that that would be then an issue for a future date. So once we're talking about the um steps being taken by KJI itself which is an onshore Dubai company uh we have >> we get into an area of conflict of laws. >> We precisely we do and none of that has been properly argued before your honor today. There is a um the dispute resolution clause in the MOA itself um refers to a final decision of the Dubai courts. Now, of course, it's settled law that the DIC is a Dubai court, but I'm afraid the answer is not as uh facile as that because one must in fact look at a look at the contract as a whole and a proper interpretation of what this contract means in that wording. And this is an onshore Dubai company. Um, and this is all about uh federal decree law 32 of 2021 and the commercial contracts law. So, so, excuse me, the commercial companies law. I mean even if e even if one could as a matter of construction construe Dubai courts to include the DIC courts um uh you still get into all of those uh sections of dice and Morris about foreign corporations that one would have to look at I think >> precisely so so certainly this is a point given we're at uh 4:30 on a Friday this becomes a a very complex area once looking at the detail of the relief sort. So my my my brief submission in terms of declaratory relief. If your honor is against me on the declaratory relief point uh so excuse me on liability of termination then uh then clearly paragraph two will be made against my client um that to effectively invalidate a termination. Uh but then what follows from that should not happen at this stage. Um and if there is to be any further um steps being taken by accord, it would be no greater than simply a restatement of uh the the the contractual language in the joint venture itself. And >> yes, I could order I could order that uh that uh Mr. Ivankovich is appointed uh director So you could uh >> I could give give force to uh assuming that I accepted um that f a bound the parties then I could enforce um I I could specifically enforce uh FA1 uh that um Mr. Vankovich should be appointed as a director. Uh equally I could enforce uh if I was so minded of course uh H B uh that uh he be given unlimited access to the books and records of of the company. >> Yes. So dealing with those two points briefly. So in terms of the uh uh the appointment of Mr. Vankovich. uh I if I there is open to me to a certain extent a bit of a neat argument about the words initial director and whether in fact that's all being wised by the MOA but I think for the purpose of 430 on a Friday we can step on um from that um uh I if if you against me on liability and if you is minded to to take a step through the appointment for board of director then uh then I I can um I'm not here to concede anything on behalf of my client, but but what one one can see the court might then take the step of directing the appointment to Mr. Anankovich, but the precise wording of that um would need to be carefully done and it would require specific argument. So, uh pausing here, all of this I say should be a matter for a standalone consequential hearing once we know the the the factual position of termination. and we then come back for a half a day or a day in front of you on her and have a proper discussion about all of that. This is not the sort of relief that should be bolted on uh uh in a draft order that has contempt uh consequences flown for my client. >> Well, I can't see why it should have a penal notice on it in any event. Well, so certainly if there's be anything that looks like a mandatory injunction on my part to take a particular step to for example to vote in favor of the appointment of Mr. Vanovich uh then then all of that should be done very carefully indeed. In terms of provision of document as you want to point out HB is what we see in the contract about the access that's had there and that is um uh materially different to what is said in the draft order. So the draft order uh at page 1077 uh requires procuring of electronic copies of all the documents that are in 1078 and this is incredibly wide ranging. So, we have bank statements showing the receipt and subsequent use of uh excuse me, we're back in the supplemental bundle here for the EP operator and those following along. Um, subsequent use of the various different payments. I say the the correct order to be made at this stage is declaratory relief that Mr. Vanovich uh has unlimited access to the books and records for the joint venture without courts and that declaration in itself is unnecessary once the court uh makes declaration that the joint uh venture agreement uh has not been terminated. So I say the gateway through which your honor should pass is first of all is entitled to a declaration of the primary leave. Secondly, if he is entitled to that, should the court take any further step about any of these other details at all? And I say no, it shouldn't. These are matters which uh uh flow on inside the joint venture agreement. And there's no utility for the court simply stating what the contract says. Uh and then if the parties come back before the court to say there's been a breach of contract or something different, well, that's a matter that then happens at that point. Um but what should not be ordered now is uh is is specific performance of documentation of this type and one looks at schedule paragraph two all bank statements for bank accounts in the name of the third defendant on a what possible basis would Mr. Watson's client have have a right uh for uh um or that excuse me that's third defend that's KJI excuse me so so that >> yes he does have a right >> yes he would for that but the first and second defendants he doesn't and that's what flows through from paragraph one um so if there's any orders to be made it would simply be restatements of the of the JDA itself uh your honor That concludes what I would like to say. I have been informed by uh by WhatsApp message that um uh Mr. Al Jasmine would like to address the court very briefly himself uh as a director of the company. Um you're shaking your head your your head your honor, but perhaps you could articulate any um any reason you have as to whether or not Mr. Jasmine has a right to do so. >> No, he doesn't. He's represented by solicitors and council. If uh he wishes to instruct you to say anything, he can do. >> Thank you. I have nothing further to say. >> Thank you very much, >> Mr. Watson. Your honor, just um a few short points in reply. um dealing first with the loan claim and I should preface all of my reply by saying if your honor doesn't wish to hear me on a particular point, make it clear and I'll move on. Um but in relation to just the structure of the loan agreement because my loaner friend spent quite a bit of time there and in my submission his approach to the loan agreement is not correct. So we go back to it briefly at page 9004. So clause me friend sort of treads a fine line between saying this isn't a loan and it is a loan. So you have my case it is a loan alone proper capital L. Clause two defines the loaned money as the entirety of the 3.9 million. Clause three provides that the loan is without charge of interest, but that's subject to something which I'll come back to in a moment. And then the the crucial fulcrum, if I can call it that, for the repayment provisions is condition 4A on page 9004, which is that KJM will purchase the vessel because this is a loan in the sense that it always contemplates the repayment of everything that is advanced under it. It's just that the terms of the repayment def depend upon this fulcrum of the purchasing of the vessel. In 4 A, KJM purchases the vessel and then the rest of the clauses in clause four follow and you get to D, which is upon the sale, KJM repays to contest the amount paid by the purchaser subject to the agreed upon distribution in 7B. So it you repay the loan first and then the profits are split. So if the vessel is purchased, the loan is repaid that way. The other side of the falculum is then in clause five. In the event the vessel is not purchased, KJM shall return all funds. So if the vessel is purchased, the loan is repaid through clause 7B on a sale. If the vessel is not purchased, the loan is repayable immediately. That's clause five. The only circumstance that the contract provides for in which the loan is not repaid is over the page 905 and it's clause 6B and that is an a default by Contessa and that so that is a circumstance in which your honor finds that Contessa is obliged to advance funds and fails to do so in breach. Now the loan of friend said well uh the loan is an interestfree loan but that's not the entirety of the story because clause 6A little two contessers remedies for default in the event of a default by KGM and subsequent failure to cure contessor may elect to terminate the agreement receive return of the loan monies or any monies paid on the date of termination plus interest at the maximum rate allowed by law. I've set this all out in my skeleton. But the way this arises is that in August 2024 when the transaction came to an end. Clause 5 is triggered. So there's an obligation to repay. There is no repayment. Therefore, there is a default. Therefore, there is an obligation to pay interest. As I say, I've set it all out in my skeleton, but just so you understands the shape of this contract. Um, so you want to posing a hypothetical to my learner friend about what happens if an an unsatisfactory report is presented. Well, the point about a condition precedent is that it's always open to KJM to have another go. So if they present a report and it's unsatisfactory evidently what's contemplated by the contract is that they go back works on the boat whatever and then they come back and then once a surveyor says this is satisfactory and contesttor agrees the condition is triggered and the money is released and the purchase occurs. So there's nothing in the contract that that prevents essentially the process that the parties were envisaging which is that it gets surveyed and you have a report and you might need to go back and deal with things and then come back. The point is is that what pause 2B is triggered by is that final bit in the process where the surveyor says yeah this is fine and and contest agrees. Just moving on the next point by way of reply um to do to do with and this is a very technical point but um the issue of whether there is or your honor needs to decide whether there is a sale contract between uh KJM and Sino Eagle. I just want to make it absolutely clear um it has never been admitted by Contessa that there is a sale contract. So if Yanna was taken briefly to the list of issues at page four and the learner friend is is quite right that the word draft ought to have been deleted. This is the agreed list of issues of common ground. But your honor will find nowhere in the common ground a statement that um KJM entered into a contract with Sino Eagle because that was never common ground. where it comes in as an issue is down at page seven where 4.2 the issue was if contestant was obliged to advance funds under clause 2B 4.2 to did KJM suffer a loss? Did KJM suffer a loss? And so it the KJM has to prove its loss. And just to show you how this is put in my pleading at paragraph 55, sorry, um it's a long page reference. Uh, sorry, it's page 34, paragraph 29. Paragraph 55 was the claim to the loss. Our case was, well, your loss is not admitted. Say that we admit that the transaction between you and Sino Eagle came to an end. We didn't really say what that transaction was because we don't know. And then there's a plea about if the deposit is lost, that's that's not a loss suffered by you. So Melon friend has to make out a case in loss. So that's where that is. Um and I I me friend showed you a lot of correspondence but uh where certainly where Sino Eagle asserted a right to forfeit the deposit but nowhere the source of that. Um your honor made the comment to my friend um when he was addressing the timing of the provision of the admiral report about well what reason would they possibly have not to disclose it. Um I don't think anyone needs to come to a final conclusion on that question but one can think of many reasons. The most obvious is what's quite clear from the correspondence and I think your honor saw some of this in the cross- examination is that at the very beginning before the loan agreement is signed everyone is sort of certainly on the um JJM side talking about speed and rather suggests that what was sold to um contestant was a boat that was ready to go and it's quite plausible that when the survey report came back and showed some defects that needed rectifying. KJM took the view that they needed to go and rectify them and then come back and of course lots h the problem is is that this transaction is conceived and then a lot of other things happen in parties relationship and it's clear that at various stages the acrylic just slightly gets um lost. >> I mean you you hold these dates in your your mind. I don't. So, we've got the report I in uh July 2023. >> Yeah, it's around the 10th of July. I don't think anyone knows >> Yeah. Yeah. What date was the um remedial document issued by the um by by the factory by by the yard. That is the 29th of February 2024. >> That's page 1183 just for your >> Thank you. >> Just on waiver. Um I think my learner friend suggested that in my opening submissions I had sort of conceded the pleading point. absolutely did not. All I said was I can meet this case on the facts if necessary. But I made it perfectly clear. That's day one, page 13. I made it perfectly clear that my suspicion was going to be this case is not open to him in closing. If your honor is against me on that point, I have things to say obviously, but my primary position is none of that case was pleaded and my learner friend asserted in his submissions that the full factual matrix is before you, but it's obviously not partly because we didn't get an opportunity for any disclosure on it. So, moving on to the JVA claim, I've just got um two topics to cover very briefly. Um in terms of the late payments, my friend showed you a couple of documents which he asserted uh were demands for payment, but he did not engage with the prior question. Um, and so if you if we go back to page 914 of the bundle, which is the second amendment, neither the second tranch nor the third tranch are payable on demand. So it is not the case that KJM or KJI can simply demand the second or third tranch. A demand is only relevant if there is a default and then a request to cure. But legally, KJM or KJI have to establish that some monies are due first before they're entitled to send a default notice. So Malone friend doesn't have a case on when these sums are due. So all questions of demand are irrelevant unless and until your your honor is satisfied that tranch 2 and tranch three were due on a particular date and just because Mr. Al Jasmine and Mr. Rad one assert that they were due doesn't make them due. In then in relation to uh the relief um it's the first time that um there's really been any engagement with the relief sort on the JV claim. Um it has all been out there before as I explained but perhaps we could just go very briefly to the the draft order as if everyone's been looking at it. Um your honor raised the question of jurisdiction. There is no jurisdictional problem at all for this simple reason. None of the orders in this uh draft order are orders against the third defendant. They are orders against the first defendant KJM which is a party to the JVA. and the JVA has a jurisdiction clause expressly in favor of the DIFC courts. So all these orders require um the first defendant to do is to procure various things. And it it goes back that passage in Chitty that I showed you that where a party KJM agrees in a contract here the JVA to a certain result it necessarily agrees to do all those things that are necessary to bring about that result. And that's why the order says procures various things. And so again, my own friend took you for instance to the provision of documents. But all those documents are documents um to which my client would be entitled under clause H. Like for instance, the bank statements of the third defendant. It's not accepted that it doesn't necessarily have bank accounts. Like the bank statements to show where the money that's been paid into the joint venture have gone. there obviously. And so the order is that the if you want to look at it at page 43, the first defendant shall and shall procure that the third defendant shall provide the claimant with the relevant documents. And that's because um when you look at the the JV agreement for example at um 88 5 there is an obligation at HA on each venturer to keep books and records and to give the other venturer access to the other ventures books and records. That's about access to KJM's records. And then B, each venturer shall have unlimited access to the books and records. Well, what must that mean? That must mean that KJM must do everything that it can do in its power to procure that Mr. um Ivankovic has access to the books and records. At the moment, they're all in the hands of Mr. Al Jasmik, who is KJM's manager. Um, some objection was taken if you could just go back to this the draft order to Baker Tilly. I mean, I I had understood from the correspondence that there actually wasn't an objection to Baker Tilly per se and one one sees that at well, I might just leave that there. I mean, I don't I don't I don't think Mr. our judge has ever objected to the appointment of Baker Tilly per se. But there we go. I mean the the the logic for enforcing it is if if um KJM agrees to a contract that says there will be an audit uh bianually, it's necessarily agreeing to do all things necessary to achieve that result. And that must mean, as the order provides, procuring that the general assembly occur and and voting in favor of the appointment of an auditor. So all these all these orders are entirely conventional orders for specific performance against the first defendant to require it to do all that's necessary to achieve the result that it agreed. But you know, I leave it to your honor. I set out a draft. If your honor wants to deal with the mechanics of the draft at a at a second hearing, you know, your honor will have a view. But I think um unless there's anything else that I can assist your honor with, um those are my submissions. >> No, thank you very much indeed. Um so there's nothing further I think for either party to add at this stage. We are finished with submissions. Is that right? >> Nothing more from the claimment. Nothing more from uh >> nothing more from me. >> Uh in which case uh it won't surprise you that I'm going to reserve my judgment and uh I I I will hope to get it uh to you as soon as my workload permits. Uh thank you both for your helpful and interesting submissions. Uh thank you to the uh court reporter uh and the EP operator for their assistance. We couldn't function without them. Uh and uh I wish everybody a good weekend. Thank you very much. >> Thank you.