---
title: "Zhu Zhai Holdings v. Ivankovich — N.D. Ill. Doc. 91 opinion (default judgment)"
source_court: "N.D. Ill."
docket: "1:20-cv-04985"
order_date: "2021-08-17"
claim_label: "Verified - verbatim public court record"
mirrors: "records/text/zhu-zhai-v-ivankovich-ndil-doc91.txt"
public_records_notice: "HelmLegal public records mirror. Not a law firm. Not legal advice. Not a PACER substitute."
---

# Zhu Zhai Holdings v. Ivankovich — N.D. Ill. Doc. 91 opinion (default judgment)

> **Public-record mirror.** This page reproduces a court order/opinion for public-record research. It is not legal advice, is not a finding of liability beyond what the court actually held, and is not a substitute for PACER or licensed counsel. Dollar figures appear only as stated in the underlying court document.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
EASTERN DIVISION 
 
ZHU ZHAI HOLDINGS LIMITED and 
) 
PETER PUI TAK LEE, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
) 
Case No. 20-cv-4985 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
) 
Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STEVEN IVANKJOVICH,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Defendant. 
 
) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 
 
Plaintiffs Zhu Zhai Holdings Limited and Peter Pui Tak Lee brought this lawsuit against 
defendant Steven Ivankjovich alleging breach of guaranty agreements and fraudulent inducement 
claims.  After repeatedly failing to meet court deadlines and participate in this lawsuit, the Court 
entered default against defendant on July 1, 2021 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a).  
Before the Court is defendant’s motion to vacate the default entry pursuant to Rule 55(c) and 
plaintiffs’ renewed motion for default judgment under Rule 55(b)(2).  For the following reasons, the 
Court, in its discretion, denies defendant’s motion to vacate the entry of default and grants plaintiffs’ 
motion for default judgment. 
Background 
   Plaintiffs, investors located in Hong Kong, base their claims on two loans (“ZZH Loan” 
and “Lee Loan”) totaling $3,000,000 that they extended to entities controlled by defendant and for 
which defendant served as guarantor.  According to plaintiffs, defendant, who is CEO of Atlas 
Apartment Acquisitions, LLC (“Atlas Acquisitions”) and Atlas Residential Holdings, Limited (“Atlas 
Holdings”), induced them into making the loans by representing that he was seeking pre-IPO 
financing to take Atlas Acquisitions public.  Although both loans have matured, defendant, as 
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guarantor, has yet to repay the loans in full.  Prior to filing this lawsuit, plaintiffs made numerous 
good faith efforts to secure payment of the loans.  
After plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on August 24, 2020 and served summons on defendant, 
defendant failed to respond to the complaint.  On October 2, plaintiffs filed their first request for 
entry of default under Rule 55(a) that the Court continued until October 28.  Defendant attended 
the October 28 hearing pro se, at which time the Court warned him about a possible default.  The 
Court also set a deadline of November 12 for defendant’s counsel to file an appearance on the 
docket.  Defendant failed to secure counsel by that deadline.  At the November 17 status hearing, 
defendant did not appear and the Court granted plaintiffs’ first request for entry of default.  
Plaintiffs then filed a motion for default judgment on November 20, and the Court set a hearing for 
December 1.  On November 27, defendant’s retained counsel appeared and moved to vacate the 
Court’s entry of default.  In this first motion to vacate the default entry, defendant acknowledged 
that an order of default would open him up to $3 million in liability.  (R. 20, 11/27/20, Motion to 
Vacate, at 3.)  The Court granted the motion to vacate on December 1 and defendant filed an 
answer on December 22. 
On January 15, 2021, plaintiffs served interrogatories and document requests and defendant 
served responses on February 16 making numerous objections.  Defendant refused to continue 
discovery until the objections were resolved.  Plaintiffs responded by filing a motion to compel that 
Magistrate Judge Cox granted.  On May 10, approximately three weeks before the close of fact 
discovery, defendant’s counsel moved to withdraw.  On May 21, the Court granted the withdrawal 
motion and ordered defendant to secure new counsel by June 21.  The Court also set a status 
hearing for June 21, which the Court later reset to July 1.   
After the June 21 deadline passed without an appearance by new counsel, plaintiffs filed 
their second request for the entry of default.  After a July 1 motion hearing, where defendant did not 
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appear pro se or otherwise, the Court granted plaintiffs’ request and entered default against 
defendant.  Plaintiffs then filed a renewed motion for default judgment on July 9 and at the July 21 
hearing on that motion, defendant’s counsel, who had yet to file an appearance, was present.  The 
Court then set a hearing date for August 4 and continued the motion for default judgment.  On 
August 3, the night before the motion hearing, defendant’s counsel filed a motion for leave to 
appear pro hac vice.  Defendant’s counsel also filed a motion to vacate the entry of default and 
opposition to the motion for entry of default judgment.  Defense counsel’s appearance was 
docketed on August 4, which was over six weeks after the June 21 deadline. 
Legal Standard 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for 
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by 
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.”  Rule 55(b)(2) allows district courts 
to enter final judgment on an entry of default.  Arwa Chiropractic, P.C. v. Med-Care Diabetic & Med. 
Supplies, Inc., 961 F.3d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 2020).  Under Rule 55(c), “[a]n entry of default may be set 
aside before entry of judgment upon showing good cause for the defendant’s inaction, prompt steps 
to correct the default, and an arguably meritorious defense to the lawsuit.”  Parker v. Scheck Mech. 
Corp., 772 F.3d 502, 505 (7th Cir. 2014).  District courts have considerable discretion in ruling on 
Rule 55 motions.  JMB Mfg., Inc. v. Child Craft, LLC, 799 F.3d 780, 792 (7th Cir. 2015); Relational, 
LLC v. Hodges, 627 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 2010). 
Discussion 
Motion to Vacate Entry of Default 
The Court first turns to defendant’s motion to vacate the default entry by considering 
whether he had good cause for his repeated failures to meet the Court’s deadlines.  Here, defendant 
argues that the Court never notified him when it rescheduled the June 21, 2021 status hearing to July 
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1.  He specifically explains that because he was not represented by counsel at that time, he never 
received electronic notification.  Further, defendant contends that the written notice was mailed to 
his address in Illinois, but not to his address in Florida.   
Whether defendant was aware of the July 1 status hearing is of no moment, however, 
because he was fully aware that he was required to retain counsel by June 21, which he failed to do.  
Indeed, defendant was present at the May 21 hearing when the Court granted his counsel’s motion 
to withdraw and informed defendant that he had 30 days to secure new counsel.  (R. 82, 5/21 Tr., at 
4.)  Defendant’s lack of notice that the status hearing had changed does not amount to good cause 
for his failing to retain counsel by the June 21 deadline nor does it explain his earlier disregard for 
the Court’s deadlines.  Thus, defendant has failed to establish good cause.   
Next, to show an arguably meritorious defense, defendant must state more than bare legal 
conclusions.  Acosta v. DT & C Global Mgmt., LLC, 874 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 2017).  In his motion, 
defendant fronts two defenses:  (1) the borrower entities are indispensable parties that plaintiffs 
failed to name as defendants to this lawsuit; and (2) defendant did not commit the actions that 
would trigger his liability under the limited guaranty agreements.  Defendant’s cursory statements 
concerning his defenses fail to show he has meritorious defenses. 
First, both promissory notes state that the governing law is the law of the Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong.  (R. 16-4, Ex. D, § 4.7, 16-7, Ex. G, § 4.7.)  Defendant fails to 
show that the borrower entities are indispensable parties under this law.  In fact, defendant fails to 
cite any law supporting this defense nor does he take into consideration that if the borrower entities 
are truly indispensable, the Court would allow joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.  
Second, defendant’s bare-boned denial that he did not commit the listed actions that would trigger 
his liability as guarantor fails to provide any factual basis and it is well-settled that “a general denial 
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of the complaint’s allegations, without any factual support, is insufficient to state a meritorious 
defense.”  Wehrs v. Wells, 688 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2012). 
Last, defendant filed the motion to vacate the default entry approximately a month after 
default was entered.  Although this may be considered “prompt action,” the Court notes that this is 
defendant’s second motion to vacate and he is fully aware of his responsibilities in defending this 
action.  Moreover, defendant must make a showing as to all three requirements required to vacate a 
default entry, namely, good cause, an arguably meritorious defense, and prompt action, which he has 
failed to do.  See Kennedy v. Michael Lewis Co., No. 20 C 0948, 2020 WL 5570040, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
17, 2020) (Feinerman, J.).  The Court therefore denies defendant’s motion to vacate. 
Default Judgment 
The effect of entry of default is that the complaint’s well-pleaded allegations relating to 
liability are taken as true.  VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Illinois Trading Co., 811 F.3d 247, 255 (7th 
Cir. 2016).  “Once the default is established, and thus liability, the plaintiff still must establish his 
entitlement to the relief he seeks.”  In re Catt, 368 F.3d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2004).  Simply put, 
plaintiffs must still prove damages after default has been entered.  Wehrs, 688 F.3d at 892.  An 
evidentiary hearing on damages is not necessary if damages are capable of easy computation.  See 
Domanus v. Lewicki, 742 F.3d 290, 304 (7th Cir. 2014); 10A Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 2688 (4th ed. 2020); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b) (“The court may conduct 
hearings”).  Because the damages are capable of easy computation, the Court will not conduct a 
hearing. 
Taking the complaint’s allegations as true, both Atlas Holdings and Atlas Acquisitions have 
defaulted on the loans and the loans have matured.  Also, defendant, as guarantor, has failed to pay 
the loans in full.  Based on the declarations plaintiffs have provided, defendant owes $2,739,654 in 
principal, interest, default interest, and late fees on the ZZH Loan as of July 1, 2021.  The ZZH 
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Loan was in the amount of $2,000,000 and the interest on the principal balance was 8% per annum 
payable on certain agreed-upon dates.  The ZZH Loan also provided for a default interest rate of 
18% per annum and a late payment charge of 5% for any interest payment not rendered within five 
days of the payment date.   
As of July 1, 2021, defendant also owes $1,347,526 in principal, interest, default interest, and 
late fees on the Lee Loan.  The principal of the Lee Loan was $1,000,000.  Under the terms of the 
loan, interest on the principal balance was 8% per annum and was payable on certain agreed-upon 
dates.  In total, Lee received a $105,000 prepayment of interest on January 31, 2019, an interest 
payment in June 2019 of $33,333, and another interest payment in November 2019 for $20,222.  Lee 
received no other payments.  Also, the loan provided for a default interest rate of 25% per annum 
and a late payment charge of 5% for any interest payment not rendered within five days of the 
payment date. 
Plaintiffs also seeks reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $416,662 as of July 
6, 2021.  According to the declaration attached to the motion for default judgment, the fees and 
costs relate to:  (1) the pre-complaint investigation and review of the loan documents, underlying 
factual information, and the materials referenced in the complaint; (2) good faith efforts to avoid 
litigation by sending defendant a demand letter and a pre-filing copy of the complaint; (3) drafting 
and filing of the complaint; (4) post-filing service efforts; (5) motion practice related to the earlier 
request for entry of default and motion for entry of default judgment, a motion to compel, and the 
current request for entry of default and motion for entry of default judgment; (6) drafting, serving, 
and responding to discovery requests; (7) hiring a discovery vendor to forensically collect documents 
from plaintiffs’ document custodians; (8) hosting, reviewing, and preparing to produce those 
documents; and (9) the hearings before the Court and Magistrate Judge Cox. 
Defendant does not dispute the amounts due as set forth by plaintiffs in their motion for 
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default judgment and attached declarations.  Thus, defendant owes plaintiffs $4,087,180 on the two 
loans and $416,662 for fees and costs for a total of $4,503,842. 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing, the Court, in its discretion, denies defendant’s motion to vacate the 
July 1, 2021 entry of default [86] and grants plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment in the total 
amount of $4,503,842 [77].  Civil case terminated.  
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Date: 8/17/2021 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entered: _____________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  United States District Judge 
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