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Opinion — Zhu Zhai Holdings Limited and Peter Pui Tak Lee v. Steven Ivankovich (7th Cir.)

Verified United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · docket 25-2561 (consolidated 25-2585, 25-2649, 25-3185) · filed 2026-10-20

Appellate opinion affirming the district-court judgment. Consolidated appeals Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, and 25-3185; opinion Document 51.

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In the 
United States Court of Appeals 
For the Seventh Circuit 
____________________ 
Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185  
ZHU ZHAI HOLDINGS LIMITED and PETER PUI TAK LEE, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
and 
JEANETTE IVANKOVICH,  
Intervenor-Appellee, 
v. 
 
STEVEN IVANKOVICH, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
PILGRIM CARIBBEAN ISLE LLC, et al.,  
Appellants. 
 
____________________ 
Appeals from the United States District Court for  
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 
No. 1:20-cv-04985 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.  
____________________ 
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2026 — DECIDED OCTOBER 20, 2026 
____________________ 
Case: 25-3185      Document: 51            Filed: 10/20/2026      Pages: 17
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Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185 
Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and TAIBLESON, 
Circuit Judges. 
SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. In the process of seeking to collect 
on a default judgment against Steven Ivankovich, plaintiffs 
Zhu Zhai Holdings and Peter Pui Tak Lee issued citations on 
various entities to discover Ivankovich’s assets. Facing a tan-
gled web of entities, accounts, and assets relating to and sur-
rounding Ivankovich, the district court appointed a Special 
Master to sort through the facts and post-judgment disputes. 
The Special Master then did just that, ultimately concluding 
that particular assets (once held in an escrow account as secu-
rity for loans) belonged to Ivankovich, and not to one or an-
other of the limited liability companies that laid claim to the 
same assets. Seeing no error in the Special Master’s findings, 
which the district court adopted, we AFFIRM.  
I 
A 
The underlying dispute involves unpaid loans extended 
by the plaintiffs to various entities for which Ivankovich guar-
anteed repayment. After Ivankovich “ignored the litigation,” 
the district court entered default judgment for roughly $4.5 
million, and we affirmed. See Zhu Zhai Holdings Ltd. v. Ivanko-
vich, No. 21-3038, 2022 WL 1439396, at *1 (7th Cir. May 6, 
2022).  
Ivankovich again failed to pay. The plaintiffs then issued 
a number of citations to discover his assets and collect the 
judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) provides for 
enforcement of judgments and post-judgment discovery in 
accordance with “the procedure of the state where the court 
is located”—here, Illinois. Under Illinois law, judgment 
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Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185 
3 
creditors are “entitled to prosecute citations to discover as-
sets” under 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-1402(a).  
The plaintiffs issued one such citation in January 2022 to 
Walker & Dunlop, a third-party lender that had previously 
extended about $97 million in loans to two entities that 
Ivankovich owned or operated—Alliance HTFL LLC and Al-
liance HTTX LLC—for the purchase of several properties in 
Florida and Texas. Ivankovich served as the guarantor of the 
loans. As part of the loan agreement, Walker & Dunlop es-
crowed about $1.5 million in funds to ensure payment of taxes 
and insurance for the properties in case the LLCs and Ivanko-
vich defaulted on the loans.  
In April 2022, Ivankovich’s LLCs sold the Florida proper-
ties. The sale yielded enough funds to pay off the Walker & 
Dunlop loans in full, as well as around $35 million in excess 
proceeds. With the loans paid off, Walker & Dunlop no longer 
had an interest in the escrowed funds. In the normal course, 
Walker & Dunlop would have released the funds to the bor-
rower, but with the plaintiffs’ citation pending, it instead 
froze the previously-escrowed funds awaiting the result of 
the ongoing court proceedings.  
Those proceedings proved to be complex and contentious. 
Ivankovich seems to own and manage a maze of LLCs, sev-
eral of which intervened in the post-judgment proceedings. 
Those LLCs—the two Alliance LLCs, and five LLCs whose 
names all begin with the word “Pilgrim”—asserted that the 
previously-escrowed funds could not be used to satisfy the 
plaintiffs’ $4.5 million default judgment, because those funds 
belonged to them and not Ivankovich. Both Walker & Dunlop 
and the Pilgrim LLCs moved to dismiss the citation, but the 
district court declined to do so. Facing a chorus of objections 
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Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185 
by the multiple LLCs and entities surrounding or affiliated 
with Ivankovich, the district court made the wise decision to 
appoint a Special Master, retired U.S. Magistrate Judge Sid-
ney I. Schenkier, to navigate the facts and determine owner-
ship of the previously-escrowed funds.  
In due course, Ivankovich’s estranged wife, Jeanette 
Ivankovich, intervened in the district court, asserting that she 
too had a claim over the previously-escrowed funds. She 
agreed with the plaintiffs that the previously-escrowed funds 
belonged to Ivankovich, but asserted that she held a superior 
interest in at least $600,000 of the funds—the amount of child 
and spousal support that Ivankovich had failed to pay. 
B 
After a five-month discovery period and a two-day hear-
ing on the question of whether the funds belonged to Ivanko-
vich or the LLCs, the Special Master issued his report and rec-
ommendation, finding that, under Illinois law, the funds be-
longed to Ivankovich. The Special Master’s conclusion was 
the fruit of substantial diligence, including thorough consid-
eration of the record evidence and witness testimony pre-
sented by the parties—all conveyed in great detail and with 
substantial clarity in his report.  
The Special Master explained that under the Illinois cita-
tion statute “[t]he judgment creditor has the burden of show-
ing that a citation respondent has assets of the judgment 
debtor.” Kalmin v. Varan, 216 N.E.3d 984, 992 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2021). The provisions of the citation statute are to be “liberally 
construed.” Id. In line with that liberal construction, the 
phrase “assets belonging to the judgment debtor” is treated 
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Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185 
5 
as “very open-ended.” Nat'l Life Real Est. Holdings, LLC v. 
Scarlato, 83 N.E.3d 44, 55–56 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). 
From there the Special Master assessed whether the plain-
tiffs showed that the Walker & Dunlop previously-escrowed 
funds were assets belonging to Ivankovich. The Special Mas-
ter first determined that the funds—absent the citation—
would have suffered the same fate as the sales proceeds from 
the Florida properties in that both would be “released to the 
seller” and deposited in the Alliance HTFL account.  
Finding Ivankovich’s treatment of the sales proceeds to be 
“highly relevant” to the question regarding the funds before 
him, the Special Master detailed the “complete control” that 
Ivankovich exercised over those proceeds. In particular, 
Ivankovich transferred tens of millions of dollars out of the 
Alliance account and into accounts of two of his other LLCs. 
From those two accounts, he made payments for a personal 
credit card, a tennis club membership, rent on a family resi-
dence, expenses related to his personal yacht, and attorneys 
he had engaged in connection with his pending divorce pro-
ceedings. In the final tally, these personal expenditures ran 
more than $2.8 million dollars.  
Even more, the Special Master saw no evidence that any 
third-party LLCs ever complained about Ivankovich’s use of 
those funds for his personal purposes. These facts convinced 
the Special Master that “but for the freeze of the money held 
by Walker & Dunlop at the time of the sale of [the Florida] 
properties,” Ivankovich would have exercised “complete do-
minion” over the previously-escrowed funds. Accordingly, 
the Special Master found that the funds were Ivankovich’s 
and could be used to satisfy the outstanding default judg-
ment.  
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Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185 
In making these findings, the Special Master went out of 
his way to observe that “a lack of credibility permeated 
[Ivankovich’s] testimony.” What most troubled the Special 
Master was seeing documents executing critical transactions, 
plainly bearing Ivankovich’s signature, only to hear Ivanko-
vich testify—under oath—that he had no knowledge of or in-
volvement in those transactions. In the Special Master’s 
words, Ivankovich “was repeatedly evasive, combative or 
flippant, and exhibited a level of disrespect for the process 
that the Special Master rarely has seen in his 46 years of in-
volvement in the legal profession.”  
The Special Master then turned to the LLCs’ legal objec-
tions. Most relevant for our purposes, the LLCs argued that 
the plaintiffs were attempting to transfer liability from one of 
its members, Ivankovich, to the LLCs—a maneuver some-
times known as reverse corporate veil piercing. The LLCs 
contended that such a practice was impermissible under ei-
ther Illinois law, the law of the forum, or Delaware law, the 
law of the state where the LLCs were incorporated. The Spe-
cial Master saw this position as a “straw man” because under 
Illinois law, the plaintiffs would not be permitted to pierce the 
corporate veil in supplementary proceedings. The Special 
Master also underscored that the LLCs’ position assumed a 
central fact at issue—that the assets in question belonged to 
the LLCs and not Ivankovich.  
With 
the 
Special 
Master’s 
finding 
that 
the  
previously-escrowed funds were Ivankovich’s within the 
meaning of the Illinois citation statute, the only question that 
remained was whether Jeanette’s interest in the funds was su-
perior to the plaintiffs’ judgment. The Special Master recom-
mended further proceedings be conducted on this issue.  
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Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185 
7 
In an order entered on August 7, 2025, the district court 
accepted and adopted the Special Master’s report and recom-
mendation and directed him to hold those further proceed-
ings. Three of the four appeals before us challenge this August 
7 Order finding that the previously-escrowed funds belonged 
to Ivankovich. The Pilgrim LLCs filed two of those appeals, 
and the third came from Ivankovich himself. 
Before the Special Master could evaluate whether Jeanette 
or plaintiffs’ claims took precedence, however, the plaintiffs 
and Jeanette filed a joint motion to disburse the funds, stating 
that they had agreed to split the funds equally between them. 
The Pilgrim LLCs sought to stay disbursement pending the 
outcome of their appeals. The district court denied their mo-
tion in a November 14 Order, which eliminated the need for 
further proceedings and gave way to Jeanette and the plain-
tiffs’ agreed-upon disbursement. The Pilgrim LLCs then filed 
a separate appeal of the November 14 Order, the last of the 
four consolidated appeals before us. 
II 
Our first obligation is to ascertain whether we have juris-
diction to entertain these appeals. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we 
have jurisdiction to review “all final decisions” entered by the 
district court. For purposes of appeal, we treat post-judgment 
proceedings as “separate, free-standing lawsuits,” and evalu-
ate the finality of each separate proceeding. MedLegal Sols., 
Inc. v. Premium Healthcare Sols., LLC, 166 F.4th 657, 665 (7th 
Cir. 2026).  
A post-judgment order reflects a final decision within the 
meaning of § 1291 if it “addresses all the issues raised in the 
motion that sparked the postjudgment proceedings.” Solis v. 
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Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185 
Current Dev. Corp., 557 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2009). If all that 
remains by the terms of an order are “ministerial actions” by 
the court, “finality may exist.” MedLegal, 166 F.4th at 665 
(quoting Star Ins. Co. v. Risk Mktg. Grp. Inc., 561 F.3d 656, 659 
(7th Cir. 2009)). Put more directly, a decision is final under 
§ 1291 if it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves noth-
ing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Id. at 664 
(quoting Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of Int'l 
Union of Operating Eng'rs & Participating Emps., 571 U.S. 177, 
183 (2014)). 
The November 14 Order satisfies that standard. The order 
served as a functional approval of the agreement between 
Jeanette Ivankovich and the plaintiffs to split the funds 
equally, reaffirming that the Pilgrim LLCs had no remaining 
stake in the funds. The order therefore resolved the remaining 
questions left unanswered in the court’s August 7 Order and 
adjudicated all parties’ rights in the contested funds. Because 
the Pilgrim LLCs timely filed their last appeal less than 30 
days after the district court’s entry of the November 14 Order, 
we have jurisdiction to hear at least one of these four consoli-
dated appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). 
The other three appeals before us present a more complex 
scenario. Those appeals stem from the district court’s August 
7 Order, in which the district court adopted the Special Mas-
ter’s report and recommendation. By its terms, though, that 
order contemplated further proceedings on the merits of Jean-
ette’s claim to the contested funds, more than a mere ministe-
rial task. See MedLegal, 166 F.4th at 664. Still, any lack of final-
ity in the August 7 Order is not dispositive. Had the Pilgrim 
LLCs appealed solely from the August 7 Order, we might 
have had to consider whether their premature appeals could 
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Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185 
9 
relate forward under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(a)(2). See Brown v. Columbia Sussex Corp., 664 F.3d 182, 187–
190 (7th Cir. 2011). But the Pilgrim LLCs’ subsequent appeal 
of the November 14 Order secures our jurisdiction over their 
claims, so even if their other appeals related forward, they 
would only be duplicative and dismissed all the same. See 
Harris v. Bellin Mem'l Hosp., 13 F.3d 1082, 1083 (7th Cir. 1994). 
As to Ivankovich’s sole appeal of the August 7 Order, 
which also appears to be premature, we conclude we lack ju-
risdiction on other grounds—his lack of standing. Article III 
limits a federal court’s authority to the resolution of “Cases” 
or “Controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The doctrine of 
standing exists to enforce this limitation and requires “that 
any person invoking the power of a federal court must 
demonstrate standing to do so.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 
U.S. 693, 704 (2013). The familiar “triad of injury in fact, cau-
sation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III’s 
case-or-controversy requirement.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103–04 (1998) (footnote omitted). 
“[S]tanding must be met by persons seeking appellate review, 
just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first 
instance.” Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 
197, 211 (2020).  
The injury Ivankovich seeks to redress on appeal is un-
clear. He plainly lacks a financial stake in the outcome of the 
supplemental proceedings. Indeed, to assert that he has such 
a stake would, in essence, be asking us to affirm the district 
court’s decision, an unusual request from an appellant. Put 
another way, Ivankovich might have standing to assert that 
the previously-escrowed funds are his, but such an assertion 
would be self-defeating because it would allow the plaintiffs 
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Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185 
to recover those funds in partial satisfaction of the unpaid $4.5 
million default judgment. And while Ivankovich makes 
vague reference to his fiduciary duties as the manager of the 
Pilgrim LLCs, he fails to identify how an adverse outcome re-
sults in injury personal to him. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 
U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (“For an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it 
‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’” 
(quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 n.1 (1992)). 
We dismiss Ivankovich’s appeal for lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction.  
III 
For the appeals brought by the Pilgrim LLCs, two obser-
vations warrant emphasis at the outset. First, Ivankovich 
wove around himself an intricate web of limited liability com-
panies whose roles and functions remain unclear from the 
record before us. Regardless, we need not untangle it all to 
decide these consolidated appeals. Second, the Special Master 
worked diligently to get to the heart of the issue presented—
whether the previously-escrowed funds belonged to Ivanko-
vich. In the final analysis, we see no abuse of discretion, clear 
error, or legal error in any aspect of his findings.  
The Pilgrim LLCs, of course, see things differently. They 
level several challenges at the Special Master’s reasoning, in-
cluding that the Special Master exceeded the scope of his au-
thority, improperly considered entities not before him, and 
erroneously ignored that the previously-escrowed funds 
must have belonged to the LLCs because they were needed to 
pay property taxes and insurance on the Texas properties that 
the LLCs still owned. They also assert that the Special Master 
permitted reverse corporate veil piercing by allowing the 
plaintiffs to hold the LLCs liable for Ivankovich’s debts, 
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Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185 
11 
contrary to Illinois and Delaware law. And, finally, they insist 
that the district court erred by extending citation proceedings 
without an explicit finding that justice required those exten-
sions. None of these contentions persuade us.  
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[t]he 
court must decide de novo all objections to findings of fact 
made or recommended by a master.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f)(3); 
see also 52(a)(4) (“A master's findings, to the extent adopted 
by the court, must be considered the court's findings.”). But 
in interpreting the application of Rule 53(f)(3), we have dis-
tinguished between factual findings made by a special master 
after an evidentiary hearing, and those made without. See 
Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Neises Constr. Corp., 62 F.4th 1040, 1050 
(7th Cir. 2023) (reviewing without deference “the Special 
Master’s legal conclusions and all facts found without an evi-
dentiary hearing”).  
Sound reasons support this distinction: where credibility 
determinations are central to factual findings, clear error re-
view more appropriately reflects the deference necessary to 
preserve the value of evidentiary hearings. See U.S. Bank Nat. 
Ass'n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, 
LLC, 583 U.S. 387, 396 (2018) (emphasizing that “appellate 
courts should usually review a decision with deference” 
where the reviewing court would be compelled to “marshal 
and weigh evidence, make credibility judgments, and other-
wise address … ‘multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts 
that utterly resist generalization.’”); Williams v. Lane, 851 F.2d 
867, 872 (7th Cir. 1988) (stressing that “a reviewing court must 
show even greater deference to the trial court’s findings that 
involve credibility of witnesses, ‘for only the trial judge can 
be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that 
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Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185 
bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief 
in what is said’”). We will therefore take an independent look 
at legal conclusions reached by the Special Master while re-
viewing his factual findings only for clear error. 
A 
The Pilgrim LLCs insist that the Special Master exceeded 
the scope of his authority by holding proceedings that were 
unrelated to the district court’s reasons for denying the Pil-
grim LLCs’ and Walker & Dunlop’s motions to dismiss the 
citation. We disagree. The district court appointed a Special 
Master to address “issues related to but not limited to the par-
ties[’] post-judgment discovery proceedings, the discovery 
produced thus far, and the location and amount of Judgment 
Debtor Ivankovich’s assets.” By its terms, the appointment or-
der was broad, and we see nothing demonstrating that the 
Special Master exceeded the bounds of his assigned responsi-
bility.  
Nor is there any merit to the contention that the Special 
Master improperly considered certain entities not before the 
court— the Glencoe Family Dwelling LLC and A&O Family 
LLC, the two LLCs whose accounts Ivankovich transferred 
proceed funds to after the sale of the Florida properties. The 
Pilgrim LLCs identify no authority requiring that a Special 
Master presiding over supplementary proceedings limit his 
analysis to the entities before him. Such a limitation would 
make little sense, as it would handicap a Special Master’s abil-
ity to follow a paper trail in complex financial transactions 
that may be choreographed to obscure reality. 
In a related vein, the Pilgrim LLCs argue that the Special 
Master engaged in speculation by concluding that the Walker 
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Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185 
13 
& Dunlop funds would be controlled by Ivankovich in the 
same way that the proceeds from the Florida property sales 
were. They contend that the sales proceeds are distinct from 
the previously-escrowed funds because the proceeds were 
deposited in the Alliance HTFL account, while the previ-
ously-escrowed funds were, in Walker & Dunlop’s words, 
“returnable to the Pilgrim LLCs.”  
But this representation by Walker & Dunlop to the district 
court was unsupported and indeed at odds with the evidence 
before the Special Master. That evidence indicated that the 
previously-escrowed funds would have been “released to the 
seller” and deposited in the same account that received the 
net proceeds from the property sale—the Alliance HTFL ac-
count. Further, the Pilgrim LLCs, some of whom served as the 
purported title owners of the Florida properties as of 2019, ap-
pear nowhere in the numerous transfers of the 2022 sales pro-
ceeds—all meticulously traced by the Special Master and all 
initiated by Ivankovich. In light of this evidence, we see no 
clear error in the Special Master’s consideration of the 2022 
sales proceeds. 
Finally, the Pilgrim LLCs argue that the Special Master 
failed to consider that the previously-escrowed funds were 
needed to pay for outstanding tax and insurance obligations 
on the Texas properties the LLCs still own. Here too we disa-
gree. The escrow existed to secure Walker & Dunlop’s loan 
via payment of any outstanding tax and insurance obligations 
in the event of a default on the loan. But once the loan was 
fully paid off, Walker & Dunlop had no reason or basis upon 
which to restrict those funds.  
As the Special Master found, Ivankovich exercised “com-
plete dominion” over the funds in his LLCs’ accounts and 
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Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185 
therefore could have chosen to use the previously-escrowed 
funds to pay taxes and insurance on the Texas properties, or 
for some other purpose. The same is true for the millions of 
dollars in proceeds from the Florida property sales: Ivanko-
vich could have chosen to use those funds for business pur-
poses instead of personal expenses, but he did not. This 
power of choice—exercised completely by Ivankovich, with-
out objection from the Pilgrim LLCs—is precisely what led 
the Special Master to determine that the previously-escrowed 
funds belonged to Ivankovich. We see no clear error in his 
findings. 
B 
Next, the Pilgrim LLCs assert that the Special Master and 
the district court committed legal error in permitting “reverse 
corporate veil piercing” by making the Pilgrim LLCs liable for 
the judgment against Ivankovich. The district court and the 
Special Master rejected this objection, and so do we. 
The Special Master explained that efforts to pierce the cor-
porate veil are beyond the scope of Illinois supplementary 
proceedings. Under Illinois law, “the only relevant inquiries 
in supplementary proceedings are (1) whether the judgment 
debtor is in possession of assets that should be applied to sat-
isfy the judgment or (2) whether a third party is holding assets 
of the judgment debtor that should be applied to satisfy the 
judgment.” Pro. Neurological Servs., Ltd. v. City of Chicago 
Comm'n on Hum. Rels., 264 N.E.3d 543, 548, appeal denied, 270 
N.E.3d 859 (Ill. 2025) (quoting Pyshos v. Heart-Land Dev. Co., 
630 N.E.2d 1054 (Ill. 1994)).  
We have emphasized that because supplementary pro-
ceedings and actions to pierce the corporate veil “seek 
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Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185 
15 
different things,” looking “to consolidate them into one pro-
ceeding is improper.” Star Ins. Co., 561 F.3d at 661. Corporate 
veil piercing essentially serves to transfer liability from a cor-
poration to its shareholders, meaning that regardless of 
whether shareholders hold assets that belong to the corpora-
tion, they would be obligated to satisfy a judgment via their 
own personal funds. See Pro. Neurological Servs., 264 N.E.3d at 
550 (“Piercing apportions personal liability ‘independent of 
the debtor’s assets.’”). Similarly, a successful attempt at re-
verse veil piercing would transfer liability from a member to 
the limited liability corporation, obligating the LLC to satisfy 
a judgment using its own funds.  
In contrast, supplementary proceedings ask only whether 
a third party (in this case the Pilgrim LLCs) holds assets that 
belong to a judgment debtor. See Hayward v. Scorte, 164 
N.E.3d 31, 38 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020) (explaining that the Illinois 
citation statute provisions “concern certain identifiable as-
sets” and generally “do not authorize the court to enter the 
full underlying judgment against third parties”). The inquiry 
in supplementary proceedings, like the one before the Special 
Master here, is therefore more narrowly tailored to the ques-
tion of who owns or controls the assets in question. Had the 
Special Master allowed reverse corporate veil piercing, full li-
ability for the default judgment would have transferred from 
Ivankovich to the Pilgrim LLCs—putting the LLCs on the 
hook for roughly $4.5 million. That is not what happened 
here, eliminating any need for us to opine on the outer limits 
of supplementary proceedings. 
C 
Finally, the Pilgrim LLCs argue that the district court erred 
procedurally 
by 
retroactively 
extending 
the 
citation 
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16 
Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185 
proceedings without an express finding that justice required 
such extensions. This contention need not detain us.  
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 277(f) places a six-month limit 
on asset freezes under the Illinois citation statute, 735 ILCS 2-
1402, to ensure that funds are not left in limbo for an exces-
sively long period. See King v. Ionization Int’l, Inc., 825 F.2d 
1180, 1188 (7th Cir. 1987). But the rule also allows courts to 
“grant extensions beyond the 6 months, as justice may re-
quire.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 277(f). 
The district court extended citation proceedings multiple 
times without, as the Pilgrim LLCs emphasize, stating explic-
itly that justice required these extensions. But any supposed 
magic-words requirement finds no support in Illinois law or 
our understanding of proper applications of Rule 277(f).  
We observed in Laborers' Pension Fund v. Pavement Mainte-
nance, Inc., 542 F.3d 189, 193 (7th Cir. 2008), that “[b]oth state 
and federal courts construe Rule 277 liberally,” and noted that 
we “ha[d] not found examples of cases where a reviewing 
court found that a lower court’s ruling was invalid as a result 
of Rule 277(f)’s operation.” Laborers’, 542 F.3d at 194–95. In-
deed, Illinois courts routinely apply Rule 277(f) without a 
clear-statement rule. See, e.g., L.A. Sites, Inc. v. Lockport 199, 
LLC, 2023 IL App (3d) 220140-U, ¶ 23 (“To find that the Bank 
was required to specifically ask to extend the six-month pe-
riod and receive special language from the court that the six-
month period was extended would impose a condition not 
provided by the rule.”). 
The district court and Special Master Sidney Schenkier 
handled this case with great care and patience, and we see no 
Case: 25-3185      Document: 51            Filed: 10/20/2026      Pages: 17
--- page 17 ---
Nos. 25-2561, 25-2585, 25-2649, & 25-3185 
17 
procedural irregularity under Rule 277(f) or otherwise. For 
these reasons, we AFFIRM.  
 
Case: 25-3185      Document: 51            Filed: 10/20/2026      Pages: 17

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